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EDITOR’S NOTE
T

he United States has come under increasing criticism
for its inconsistent policies towards Iraq and North
Korea. Both nations have been linked in the Axis of
Evil and both are led by dangerous and repressive tyrants.
However, the Bush Administration has chosen vastly disparate
policies in dealing with them: military force against Iraq and
diplomacy and engagement with North Korea.
Why the difference? North Korea has admitted that it
is developing nuclear weapons, has pulled out of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and has refused to back down unless
the United States resumes shipping food and oil to the country.
Iraq, on the other hand, currently has no nuclear capabilities
(although certainly aspires to), has been subject to U.N. sanctions
for over a dozen years, and is now being inspected for any
sign of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
Of course, many complex factors influence U.S. foreign
policy in different parts of the world today. These include:
regional stability and the degree to which vital U.S. interests are
threatened, past military confrontation, and the number of
casualties that would result from a future conflict.
But perhaps the biggest factor of all can be summed
up in just three letters: OIL.
Oil is one of the most important ingredients to
economic growth in today’s world. In the U.S. – the most oil
thirsty nation on the planet – an increasing portion of its demand
has been met from imports from the Middle East, Venezuela
and Africa. The U.S. has gone from importing about onethird of its oil 15 years ago, to about two-thirds today.
Following the Gulf War in 1991 and for the next five
years, the U.S. imported no Iraqi oil. As facilities were rebuilt
and Iraq resumed exports through the U.N. food for oil
program, the U.S. began importing oil from Iraq once again,
although small quantities relative to consumption.
Iraq sits on top of the second largest known oil reserve
in the world but is constrained from increasing oil exports
because Saddam Hussein refuses to comply with U.N. mandates
to disarm. As a result of his intransigence, Iraq continues to
struggle under the effects of U.N. sanctions, continual U.S. and
British bombings in the no fly-zones, and a lack of foreign
investment to modernize its dilapidated oil infrastructure.
If national security, both in a physical sense and an
economic one, is truly the Bush Administration’s top priority,
the best place to start is not halfway around the globe in Iraq
or North Korea, but here at home. The best way to neutralize
Saddam and pressure our friends in the Persian Gulf to stop
fueling the flames of anti-Americanism is by becoming less
reliant on their oil. In many cases, oil revenue is the lifeblood
that keeps many of these undemocratic, repressive regimes in
power. And U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil requires us to
modify our policies in order to mollify those leaders who
control the oil.
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The Bush Administration understands that we must
reduce our reliance on foreign sources of energy, especially
from countries that have been linked to terrorism.
Unfortunately, they think the only way of doing so is by
destroying pristine wilderness areas in places like Alaska’s Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, Wyoming’s Powder River Basin and
Southern Utah’s Canyon Country. Even if the majority of
Americans were willing to sacrifice these beautiful and remote
places – which, according to polls, they are not – there is no
way we can extract enough oil and gas domestically to
significantly reduce our dependence on imports.
Take the North Slope of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. The United States Geological Survey estimates that
roughly 3.2 billion barrels of oil could be extracted economically
over roughly 50 years. In 2000, Americans consumed over 7
billion barrels of oil and consumption is projected to double
over the next 50 years. Even if we can stabilize current
consumption levels over the next 50 years, the amount of oil
we could expect from the ANWR would amount to less than
1 percent of U.S. consumption.
In the rush to sacrifice wild places in the name of
energy security, many less destructive and more sustainable
alternatives are often overlooked. Despite incredible
technological improvements in auto efficiency, the average
automobile in the U.S. today is no more efficient than 15 years
ago. If we increased auto efficiency to 40 miles per gallon
over the next decade (Toyota and Honda are already selling 5
passenger hybrid sedans that get roughly 50 mpg), we would
save roughly 15 times as much oil as could be extracted from
ANWR over the next 50 years, according to the Natural
Resources Defense Council.
Not only is this a wiser path in terms of energy security,
but could also help the U.S. to meet its responsibilities to the
world community in dealing with the looming threat of climate
change. Despite being responsible for a quarter of the planet’s
greenhouse gas emissions, the U.S. has selfishly opted out of
any mandatory reductions in emissions that most other nations
have signed on to. If the U.S. expects other nations to continue
following its lead on issues like trade and terrorism, then it
must begin showing its support for issues of global concern
like sustainable development and climate change. Only through
this type of cooperative leadership will we be able to begin
creating a safer, fairer, and more environmentally sustainable
future.

Dave Newman
Editor-in-Chief
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From Death Valley to Spring Valley:
A Case Study of Contamination in
Washington, D.C.
By Marguerite E. McLamb*
I. Introduction
pring Valley today is an enclave of well-to-do
Washingtonians, a neighborhood of prestige and
stateliness. Tucked away from the incessant din of traffic
and commerce in Northwest Washington, the neighborhood
offers elegant, shady respite. Broad, tree-lined streets wind
about gently rolling hills; million-dollar mansions beckon from
spacious homesites. Home to ambassadors and senators, famed
lawyers and doctors, and other pillars of the city, Spring Valley
is one of Washington’s most affluent communities.
Yet today’s Spring Valley was yesteryear’s “Death
Valley,” the world’s second largest chemical weapons testing
and manufacturing site during World War I. Consequences of
this past have haunted Spring Valley for decades. Buried
munitions and toxic chemicals hide in Spring Valley’s manicured
lawns. Status exempts no resident; the home of the South
Korean Ambassador is one of the most contaminated sites.
Further problems increase the physical hazards of the
contamination. From the start of the saga, the federal
government, responsible for cleaning the land, mishandled the
cleanup and failed to communicate with the public. The
community’s resulting distrust of the federal government runs
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deep. A court of law found the Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) guilty of failure to warn private citizens about the
buried munitions. The court of public opinion has found the
Corps guilty of much broader offenses throughout the Corps’
responses to contamination.
Throughout the controversy a central issue has been
the federal government’s refusal to fully investigate the
contamination and disclose its findings to private landowners.
As a result, the Corps prolonged residents’ exposure to
dangerous ordnance and toxic chemicals such as arsenic. The
contentious investigation and cleanup has inspired widespread
distrust, anxiety and fear. Residents speculate that contamination
may be the cause of rare diseases and cancers appearing in the
community. Public outrage over the government’s responses
to the contamination fueled two Congressional hearings in July
2001 and June 2002.1
The saga of Spring Valley merits attention because of
its unique status — the site is the first known formerly used
defense site that involves chemical contamination and weapons
in a residential neighborhood.2 Thus, examination of the
experience at Spring Valley may be instructive for similar, future
cleanups. As the nation continues to extensively develop and
reuse land, more conflicts at sites involving chemicals, weapons
and residents are likely to appear. Even for residential sites
solely involving conventional munitions, the experience offers
lessons for federal, state and local governments and for their
citizens.
This paper examines how poor information handling
by the federal government contributed to the chemical
contamination and cleanup problems in Spring Valley and how
better communication within and between federal agencies,
with local governments, and with the public could have
produced results more quickly and with less animosity. Part I
introduces the saga of Spring Valley. Part II discusses the history
of the Spring Valley area, the Formerly Used Defense Sites
program, legal controversies, and the legal framework
implicated. Part III identifies problems that plagued the
decades-long affair and resulted from the federal government’s
mishandling of the contamination. Part IV outlines solutions
for these issues and discusses their importance in democratic
societies and Part V concludes the case study.
II. Spring Valley’s Historical and Legal Context
Spring Valley’s character is deceptive from its surface;
sylvan prestige lies atop pits of toxic debris. The unknown
dangers lurking in the beauty of Spring Valley have fueled fear
and lawsuits. This section explores Spring Valley’s past and
explains its current status as a “formerly used defense site.”
The section then outlines tort-inspired legal controversies and
3

provides the statutory context of the cleanup and related
activities such as public participation.
A. The Hidden Past
Residents and other users of Spring Valley’s land have
always prized its tranquil character. A brief, and later forgotten,
stint as the world’s second largest chemical weapon testing
facility did not initially impact the area’s attractiveness. Since
the reemergence of the neighborhood’s past, however, infamy
and controversy mar the area’s idyllic character.
1. Land Use
a. Early History
Spring Valley’s known history begins innocuously in
the early eighteenth century, as meadow and farmland.3 During
the nineteenth century, the area was used for farming, a water
system for the District, and for Civil War fortifications.4 Earnest
development of the area began after the Civil War, as developers
and speculators became interested in the rural area.5 Residential
developments, private institutions such as American University
(“AU”), and a public training school for girls arose in the area.6
b. WWI and the AU Experimental
Station
The government’s use of the Spring Valley area for a
chemical weapons facility during World War I irreversibly
changed the land. To support the war effort, AU offered use
of its campus, with its winding paths and tree-lined streets, to
the federal government.7 The government also leased hundreds
of acres of neighboring private farmland and the site of a
girls’ training school.8
On the site, the government established the American
University Experimental Station (“AUES”), a large-scale research,
development and testing center for chemical weapons. 9 By
1918, AUES housed nearly 1000 of the 1200 chemical-weapons
researchers in the United States10 and was the world’s secondlargest poison gas production facility.11 Chemists and engineers
researched and tested hundreds of toxic chemicals, such as
mustard gas, lewisite, cyanogen chloride and arsine gases, for
chemical warfare.12 On the property, the Army constructed
facilities including laboratories, chemical storehouses and
underground concrete pits to explode chemical bombs, and
trenches.13 The Army conducted open-air and trench testing
of toxic weapons, gas masks and explosive chemical
munitions.14 In their experiments, scientists remotely detonated
these chemical weapons and measured their effects on animals.15
Confident in the Army’s ability to contain hazards from
the chemical munitions testing, local residents mostly kept their
homes.16 Then, as today, many of these homeowners were
wealthy Washingtonians.17 A few hazardous incidents occurred,
however — portents of land use conflicts to escalate in the
future. In one instance, a cloud of gas escaped from a testing
station across the street from the home of former Senator
Nathan Scott’s residence and gassed the Senator and his family.18
Due to this occurrence and others, the D.C. Board of
Commissioners requested that AUES conduct tests farther from
residential areas. The Army did not directly address the problem
in its response to the local government.19
c. Land Salvage and
Development
Activities at Camp Leach and AUES ceased by 1920,
and land salvage began. Federal agreements with the leaseholders
and AU required that the grounds be restored to their original
4

condition as much as practicable.20 Salvage efforts included
boarding up and fencing off permanent structures, such as the
concrete pits, and disposing of other structures.21 Army
regulations required burial of chemical weapons in soil at a
depth of three to three-and-one-half feet and prohibited their
disposal in water.22 The government considered buying the
AU campus to use as a permanent chemical weapons research
station but decided against the purchase.23 Little need existed
to test chemical weapons since the war was over and the Army
believed that the property was overvalued.24
Extensive residential development soon followed. In
the 1920s, the W.C. & A.N. Miller Company, a locally-owned
and prestigious development company, purchased the vast bulk
of land in the area and began creating high-priced subdivisions.25
One of these developments, Spring Valley, featured custombuilt homes and preservation of the rolling topography.26
American University resumed its campus activities after
the Army “cleaned up” the chemical weapons facility.27 AU
continued to build its campus, placing a fraternity house on the
site of an AUES former trench, which was razed and replaced
by a child-care center in 1992. AU sold land on its borders to
neighborhood developers, who then sold land to other
developers.28 Even current concern over contamination has
not stopped development; in July, 2001, the D.C. Zoning Board
approved AU’s ten-year construction plan, which starts before
the ongoing remediation is complete.29
2. Chemical Weapons Controversy
Remarkably, AUES’ status as a major chemical
weapons production and testing facility quickly faded from
memory of those in Spring Valley. For more than sixty years,
the issue remained mostly buried. In 1986, the past surfaced,
but involved parties overlooked and hid suspicious findings.
Thus, discoveries of munitions in Spring Valley in 1993 surprised
residents. These discoveries triggered a series of removal and
remediation operations that are still ongoing.
a. 1986 Investigation and
Involvement of Federal Agencies
In 1986, a surprise alarmed AU officials who had
requested a pre-construction study of potential sports complex
site. Campus publications uncovered in the study referred to
the area’s history as a chemical weapons testing and disposal
site.30 A 1921 article in AU’s student newspaper reported the
burial of chemical munitions on the land and stated,
“‘Permission was given to go far back on the university acres,
to dig a pit … bury the munitions there, and cover them up to
wait until the elements shall melt with fervent heat.’”31 A later
AU publication reported that construction of a radio station
on campus in the early 1950s was stopped because a bomb
was unearthed.32
AU historians, commissioned to examine the
university’s World War I past, concluded that chemical and
explosive weapons were probably buried on campus. 33
Concerned, AU asked the Army to investigate reports of buried
munitions.34 The Army, through the Corps, focused its search
on the discovery of munitions, however, rather than chemical
contamination. 35 AU and a division of the Army which
specialized in dealing with hazardous materials36 reviewed
historic records to locate and evaluate areas that contained
unexploded ordnance or that were potentially hazardous.37
Additionally, the Corps contracted with the Environmental
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

Photographic Interpretation Center (“EPIC”), a division of
EPA, to analyze historical aerial photos.38 EPIC flagged
potential chemical weapon burial spots on the AU campus
and in the surrounding area and informed the Corps of its
findings in 1986.39
The Corps, however, did not dig for munitions or
take soil samples, despite these flagged, potential weapons burial
sites. To justify its decision, the Corps noted that (1) extensive
development had not unearthed hazardous materials and (2)
documents indicated that AUES’s materials had been moved
to a site in Maryland.40 The Corps officially concluded that no
suspicious items were present at the AU construction site, after
using metal detectors with limited capabilities to scope the site.41
b. Public and Private Failures To
Disclose Information About the
Hazards
EPA and AU accepted the Corps’ position that no
munitions were present with little review or interest in publicly
disclosing the issue. Deciding that only actual discovery of
munitions issue would resolve the issue, the Corps stopped its
investigation in 1986.42 The Corps admitted the existence of
records containing information regarding the burial of some
toxic chemicals and conceded that the agency “could not
disprove the burial of some materials and … and [that]
subsurface ordnance could still exist.”43
During the Corps’ investigation, AU informed EPA
of the University’s suspicions and investigative activities.44 In
response, EPA told AU that the Department of Defense
(“DOD”) was the cleanup authority at formerly used defense
sites and that EPA had no first-hand knowledge of toxic
substances on the campus.45 EPA accepted this information,
though its own photographic department, EPIC, had marked
sites for further investigation while contracted by the Corps.
AU deliberately chose not to disclose information to
the public that chemical weapons were possibly buried on and
around the campus. Despite heated argument within AU’s
leadership that the University and the Corps should reveal the
findings, 46 AU decided not to publicize the information and
used the “no munitions present” conclusion to justify its silence.47
The buried material had not vanished, though the Army
had officially closed its investigation. In 1992 symptoms of
the buried problem surfaced. While grading a residential
driveway, construction workers excavated and broke a glass
bottle and had to receive emergency room treatment for eye
pain and burning skin.48 Yet no one realized the nature or
scope of the problem, much less the struggle that would ensue.
c. Operation Safe Removal Phases
I and II: No Further Action
Necessary
Spring Valley’s chemical munitions surprise was sprung
in 1993. In January, a contractor digging a utility trench
unearthed live World War I munitions.49 Though alarmed by
the recovery of obvious explosives, no one present realized
the chemical nature of the ordnance.50 Specialists quickly
determined the munitions’ chemical character, and Operation
Safe Removal Phase I began an initial three-week investigation
and removal action for the immediate area. The investigation
yielded forty-three chemical weapons,51 a sign marked “Danger
— Poison Gas,”52 and temporarily uprooted residents from
seventy-two nearby homes.53
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Operation Safe Removal Phase II, the remedial stage,
followed the immediate response action. The area officially
designated as a formerly used defense site expanded to
encompass more than 600 acres and thousands of private
homes,54 and the Corps began an investigation to determine if
explosive or chemical munitions were present and posed
adverse health risks. 55 As the investigation continued into 1994,
residents had to temporarily evacuate 130 homes.56
Charged with uncovering the weapons and the health
risks posed by the munitions, the Corps searched for metallic
objects and enlisted EPA to help conduct soil sampling.57 The
Corps tested for break-down products of lewisite, a highly
toxic chemical made with arsenic and produced at AUES;
however, the Corps did not test for arsenic, because arsenic
occurs naturally, and other chemicals could more specifically
indicate lewisite.58 Neither agency detected chemical or
explosive materials, though elevated levels of several heavy
metals were present.59 The Corps officially found no presence
of chemical warfare or explosive agents or their breakdown
compounds60 and no presence of health hazards.61 EPA did
test for arsenic and discovered some locations with high arsenic
levels, but the agency decided the sites were anomalies that did
not pose a health risk.62 EPA’s focus at the time was buried
munitions, not chemicals.63
In June 1995, the Army issued its Record of Decision
final report determining that “no further remedial action is
necessary … to protect human health and the environment” in
Spring Valley.64 The District of Columbia did not contest the
Army’s determination, and Operation Safe Removal ceased
on June 2, 1995.65
Despite the Corps’ official position that no
contamination was present, the Corps possessed evidence that
called for closer scrutiny of its findings. The Corps obtained a
photo of an AUES soldier standing beside a trench, with
carboys known to contain chemical weapons.66 The photo’s
caption read, “Death Valley — the Hole of Hades.”67 Like
EPIC’s photographically-derived suspicions in 1986, however,
the Corps overlooked the red flags.
d. Local Government, Federal
Denials, and New Emphasis on
Health Effects
Though the District of Columbia officially approved
the Corps’ decision, the District of Columbia Department of
Health (“D.C. Department of Health”), still not satisfied with
the investigation, spurred further and contentious studies that
uncovered the true nature and seriousness of the contamination.
In its review of the Corps’ 1993-95 investigation, the D.C.
Department of Health was troubled by the Corps’
methodology, its failure to conduct a survey for health effects,
and its failure to conduct a risk assessment for arsenic despite
significantly elevated concentrations.68
The Corps agreed to let the D.C. Department of Health
review the investigation of Spring Valley.69 In the review, D.C.
Department of Health environmental scientists realized that
the Corps miscalculated the location of a significant potential
burial spot and thus neglected to investigate the spot. The
D.C. Department of Health requested the Army to reinvestigate the suspect area in discussions that lasted from 1997
to 1998. Though the Corps maintained that all bombs were
accounted for and removed, the D.C. Department of Health
5

by that time had obtained suspicious aerial photos70 and
discovered that the Corps possessed the “Death Valley” photo
since 1994 71 — evidence that supported the D.C. Department
of Health’s call for a re-investigation.72
Controversy heightened when landscapers working at
AU President Ladner’s Spring Valley home broke bottles and
were burned by fumes escaping from the soil. 73 An
environmental consultant found that the laboratory glassware
contained chemical agents.74 Soil samples revealed extremely
elevated arsenic levels, as high as 1200 parts per million (“ppm”)
— nearly thirty times the EPA’s emergency removal limit of
forty-three ppm.75 The Corps, however, alleged that the
chemicals came from a photo or science lab or were pesticides
under the EPA’s jurisdiction.76
The D.C. Department of Health also requested
additional human-health studies. EPA conducted these and
focused its analysis on carcinogens, concluding that no exposure
to unacceptable levels of carcinogenic or noncarcinogenic
substances occurred.77 The Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (“ATSDR”) also participated and found no
adverse health effects.78 ATSDR did note that the Corps failed
to include in its analysis chemicals that would result from
degradation of chemical weapons.79
The Corps finally conceded in 1998 that it had
miscalculated the contested point of interest, the backyard of
the South Korean Ambassador’s residence.80 Preliminary
investigation revealed two large metallic areas, presumably
weapons burial pits, and soil samples yielded elevated levels of
arsenic.81 Both discoveries accelerated community anxiety.
e. Operation Safe Removal Phase
III: Expanded Geography and
Distrust
In March 1999, the Corps began Operation Safe
Removal Phase III, excavation of the backyard of the South
Korean Ambassador’s home. The site appeared to be a
dumping ground for AUES’s chemical laboratories.82 After
finding two burial pits, the Corps removed glass and metal
scraps including bomb parts, metal drums, contaminated debris
and glassware.83 In July, excavators reached soil that smoked
for two days.84 In all, the Corps removed more than 600
items, almost half of which were munitions and a small fraction
of which still contained chemical agents.85 Some bombs were
intact and still had fuses.86
The Corps found elevated levels of arsenic at the site
and adjacent properties,87 though it maintained AUES was not
definitively the source of contamination.88 The Corps decided
to expand its investigation to include sixty-one private residences
and fourteen acres of AU — possibly the area known at AUES
as “Arsenic Valley.”89 Throughout this period, the Army held
public meetings to address the contamination hazards.90
On a reporter’s tip, the D.C. Department of Health
requested the Corps to conduct soil sampling at AU’s Child
Development Center, located in possible “Arsenic Valley.”91
The sampling yielded significantly elevated levels of arsenic92
and triggered great community concern.93 Excavation began
at the Child Development Center and two other campus sites.
Under pressure from residents, the Corps began communitywide soil testing, which yielded a small number of homesites
with elevated arsenic levels.94 These properties are currently
undergoing time-critical removal actions.95
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The need for outside involvement was clear. To assess
the contamination threat, Washington Mayor Anthony Williams
created an independent group, the Mayor’s Spring Valley
Scientific Advisory Panel, in 2001.96 The Panel comprises
epidemiologists, toxicologists, specialists in environmental health,
and a scientifically-oriented community representative appointed
by the Chairperson of the Panel.97 The Panel holds an advisory
role to the D.C. Department of Health, though it offers
recommendations to all involved agencies.98
Simultaneously, Spring Valley citizens formed a
Residential Advisory Board (“RAB”), sponsored by the DOD.99
The RAB serves an advisory function and provides an outlet
for community concerns.100 Spring Valley’s RAB consists of
fourteen community members and representatives from the
Corps, EPA, AU, a local school, and the business community,
and other parties are often present, such as representatives from
the D.C. Department of Health and ATSDR.101
Meanwhile, EPA conducted a criminal investigation
of the Corps’ 1986 failure to disclose information about the
hazards; the agency planned to conclude that investigation in
May 2002, though results are not yet known.102 Additionally,
recent discovery of additional historical records and increased
review of old records have located new points of interest and
expanded the operation.103 The Corps plans further intrusive
investigations of sites showing anomalies.104
Concerned by the stunted progress and finger-pointing,
in July 2001 the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia,
Committee on Government Reform, held a congressional
hearing and requested a General Accounting Office (“GAO”)
investigation to examine the past conduct of the Army, EPA,
and other agencies and to assess the current contamination
threat.105 The GAO presented its report to Congress on June
26, 2002.106 The report did not allocate blame for the past but
instead focused on the current status of the restoration and
changes implemented to assist the cleanup.107 Uncertainty about
total safety and costs, however, characterized the proceedings.
When asked if residents are safe, a senior GAO official testified,
“I don’t have an answer.”108 Indeed, as one congresswoman
stated, “We are still in search of many answers.”109
B. Formerly Used Defense Sites
Spring Valley’s status as a Formerly Used Defense Site
(“FUDS”) determines significant aspects of its remediation
— the parties responsible for the cleanup and the funding it
receives.110 FUDS are properties that belong to private parties
or local governments but were once under the control and
jurisdiction of the DOD.111 As such, they are subject to DOD
cleanup authority.112 FUDS range from weapons testing areas,
such as Spring Valley, to former airfields and missile sites.113 In
spring 2002, total known FUDS in the United States numbered
9,184.114 Properties with hidden pasts whose nature as a FUDS
emerges to community surprise, such as Spring Valley, are not
entirely rare. A similar situation occurred near Marietta, Georgia
at a former artillery range abandoned after World War I.115
The area, now occupied by residences, highways, and a landfill,
was not a concern because no documented incidents involving
ordnance had occurred despite extensive construction.116
Acquisition and disposal records and other documentation were
lost or destroyed, and knowledge of the site’s past was limited
to community rumor about an ammunition round unearthed
years ago.117 The Corps conducted an archives search and
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

produced a recommendation of “no further action.”118 Spring
Valley’s tale started similarly and includes a similar
recommendation, yet the story did not end at that point.
Though Spring Valley’s situation is unique in that it is the first
known residential FUDS involving chemical weapons;
hopefully its complete story will not be one that repeats.
C. Cases and Controversies
In Spring Valley, the hazardous nature of the
contaminants, the values of the affected properties, and the
dangers to human life have sparked legal disputes that are still
ongoing. These controversies illustrate the multiple types of
impacts and concerns — physical, financial and emotional —
caused by the Spring Valley fiasco.
1. W.C. & A.N. Miller Companies
During the second phase of the remediation caused
by the construction workers’ munitions discovery, the W.C. &
A.N. Miller Companies (“Miller Companies”) submitted an
Administrative Tort Claim to the Department of the Army,
seeking over $15 million in damages.119 Miller Companies, the
major developer of the Spring Valley area, claimed the
contamination delayed closings on Spring Valley sales and
triggered a chain of negative financial effects.120 The Army’s
audit agency reviewed both Miller Companies’ administrative
claim against the Army and the remedial actions taken by the
Army. Though the audit agency initially thought the Army
acted illegally by failing to notify local authorities and third
parties about the potentially buried chemical munitions, the
audit agency reversed its position.121 The agency concluded
that that the Army had no legal or regulatory requirement to
disclose because the presence of chemical weapons in Spring
Valley could not be conclusively determined.122 As a result, the
Army denied Miller Companies’ claim.123
Miller Companies then brought its grievance to court
and charged the Army with public and private nuisance,
negligence and trespass.124 Miller Companies alleged wrongful
disposal of chemical and explosive weapons and glassware;
failure to warn of buried munitions and glassware; negligence
in the Army’s 1986 investigation; and failure to remove the
weapons and glassware prior to 1993.125 Though the claim
was later settled, the court ruled that the Army had breached
its duty to warn subsequent occupiers of the property about
buried munitions in 1986.126
“When it buried live munitions, the Army had in effect
‘booby-trapped’ the land.…It had to be obvious to
the Army…that any subsequent user of the land may
well need to excavate below the surface for subsequent
construction. It should have been recognized that such
a reasonable use of the land obviously would have
exposed the subsequent user to serious bodily harm
or possibly even death if one of the unexploded
munitions was discharged inadvertently.127

2. American University
American University, which has been acutely affected
by the contamination and cleanup, also harbors grievances
against the Army. In July 2001, AU filed an Administrative
Tort Claim with the Army.128 AU requested $86.6 million to
cover expenses related to the contamination. AU claimed
expenses including reimbursement for costs of relocation of
its admissions center, child care facility, and classes; tests of
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students and workers for toxic exposure; environmental testing;
public relations; and legal counsel. These claims also include
less quantifiable costs, such as loss of use of the athletic field;
damage to AU’s reputation; and potential loss of donations.
The amount also includes anticipated payments in potential
lawsuits naming AU a defendant.129
3. Residents
Outraged residents have also joined the courtroom
controversies. In February 1997, three homeowners filed claims
against Miller Companies and the Army and alleged negligence,
breach of duty and other torts. The court dismissed these
suits, however, because the statute of limitations had expired
and because the court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.130
In January 2001, former Spring Valley residents
Thomas and Kathi Loughlin, outraged over the long-term
handling of the contamination, began an ongoing series of
legal complaints. Prior to and during the Loughlins’ ownership
of their home, construction and excavation teams unearthed
laboratory equipment containing chemicals, projectiles
containing mustard gas, and other hazardous items from land
near their property, and studies revealed high levels of arsenic.131
During their residence in the home, Ms. Loughlin was diagnosed
with a brain tumor, and the family’s live-in nanny was diagnosed
with actinic keratosis, which may indicate arsenic exposure and
increased risk of cancer.132 The Loughlins filed an unsuccessful
administrative claim with the Army in 2001, requesting over
$2 million in damages.133 One year later, the Loughlins filed a
claim in United States District Court against the Army, AU,
and the developers of their former homesite. The Loughlins
charged negligence, failure to warn, deceit and
misrepresentation, outrageous conduct, and fraud, for selling a
private home to them on an extremely toxic chemical and
munitions dump.134
By the end of February 2002, two additional former
residents had filed suits against the Army, AU, and the developers
and alleged negligent failure to warn of the contamination.135
The Laughlins’ former nanny brought one of these suits.136 A
childhood resident of Spring Valley, who lived there from 1947
to 1964, brought the other suit.137 Autoimmune and bloodrelated illnesses have afflicted her since childhood, including
pernicious anemia, renal stenosis, multiple myelona, aplastic
anemia and actinic keratosis.138 These residents are all awaiting
resolution of their cases.
D. Statutory Framework
Federal laws, such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (“CERCLA”) and the Defense Environmental Restoration
Program (“DERP”), require DOD to perform the response
and remediation activities at Spring Valley. Under these laws,
the federal government interacts with states and localities
regarding funding and review of cleanup plans. These laws
also affected citizens’ abilities to participate in the restoration
process.
1. CERCLA
As Spring Valley’s toxic legacy illustrates, careless
disposal of hazardous materials produced unforeseen or
overlooked consequences. To address this growing, grave and
national problem, Congress enacted CERCLA.139 CERCLA
is a liability and financing scheme intended to ensure that cleanups
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occur.140 The statute imposes joint and several “strict” liability
for cleanup costs on public or private parties responsible for
creating hazardous waste sites.141 Under CERCLA, owners
and operators of storage, treatment or disposal facilities must
report the presence and releases of designated hazardous
substances to EPA.142 When releases occur, federal authorities
may respond through both immediate removal actions and
long-term remedial actions.143
CERCLA applies to the Spring Valley cleanup, because
the weapons and chemicals present at Spring Valley constitute
a “release” of a “hazardous substance” from a “facility.”144
AUES, as the disposal site of the hazardous substances, is a
facility,145 and the disposal and abandonment of the munitions
and chemicals qualify as releases.146 Because of their reactivity,
the munitions at Spring Valley are considered a hazardous
waste.147 Articles that contain mustard gas or lewisite are deemed
hazardous substances on account of their toxic contents.148
Thus, CERCLA governs cleanup activities at Spring Valley.149
Spring Valley is not on the National Priorities List (“NPL”).150
2. DERP and DERA
Under CERCLA, DOD, not EPA, assumes cleanup
responsibility and liability at defense sites.151 Congress squarely
addressed contamination related to defense activities by
implementing the DERP 152 in the 1986 amendments to
CERCLA.153 DOD must comply with CERCLA and DERP
in all immediate responses to releases of hazardous substances
from military facilities or facilities that were owned or leased
by the United States at the time of the release.154 Further, DOD
must handle responses to incidents involving DOD military
weapons and munitions or weapons and munitions under the
jurisdiction, custody or control of DOD.155 Each branch of
the armed services is responsible for cleanup of their facilities.156
The Army designates the Corps to assume cleanup tasks.157
Under DERP, DOD must interact with EPA, states
and localities regarding cleanup plans.158 DOD must notify
EPA about proposed plans and each time a cleanup phase
begins, with enough time for EPA to review the plan if
desired.159 States and localities can participate in remedial
cleanup plans by reviewing data used by the DOD.160
Funding is also a source of interaction between DOD,
states and localities. As part of DERP, Congress established
funding to enable DOD to pursue cleanups — the Defense
Environmental Restoration Account. 161 The District of
Columbia received a grant via this special account in 1993 to
pay for its removal expenses related to Spring Valley.162 The
DOD and a state may sign an agreement under the Defense
State Memorandum of Agreement program (“DSMOA”),
which allows the state to act and be paid as a regulator, while
DOD takes cleanup actions and hires contractors.163 Under
the DSMOA program, DC and the Corps signed a Defense
District Memorandum of Agreement for Spring Valley’s
remediation.164
3. Public Participation in CERCLA
and DERP
CERCLA and DERP also provide opportunities for
citizen education and participation. For cleanup plans,
CERCLA requires publication of advance notice and analysis
in a major area newspaper, a comment period, a public meeting,
publication of the final plan with explanations for changes and
responses to significant comments, and notice and explanations
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of changes made while the cleanup occurs.165 To fully participate
in such cleanup decisions communities must be able to
understand technical issues involved in cleanup decisions and
processes. CERCLA thus incorporates Technical Assistance
Grants (“TAGs”), which allow communities to hire qualified
outside technical assistance.166 These grants are only available
at National Priorities List (“NPL”) sites,167 and are generally
limited to $50,000, of which the receiving community must
pay 20%.168
DERP emphasizes citizen participation more
vigorously with specific, statutory structures organized around
citizens. DERP strongly encourages DOD to establish
Technical Review Committees (“TRCs”)169 or Residential
Advisory Boards (“RABs”) to review and comment on DOD
restoration activities.170 The primary purpose of TRCs, to review
restoration plans, is more limited than the main thrust of RABs,
to provide a forum for stakeholders representing diverse
community interests to communicate and review cleanup
strategies with DOD, EPA and other decision-making
governmental agencies.171 These groups can request technical
assistance to understand issues involved in the restoration
process.172 Funding for assistance is available through Technical
Assistance for Public Participation (“TAPP”) grants and covers
activities such as document interpretation, technology
assessment, risk evaluation participation, understanding health
risks and technical training.173 These grants come from the
same DERA funds that finance other restoration activities, and
thus may affect the amount of funding available for study,
cleanup and other activities of the RAB.174
III. Problems Preventing Successful Cleanup at Spring
Valley
Various problems beset Spring Valley and prolonged
the cleanup fiasco. Failures to communicate both within and
between government agencies, due to statutory deference,
posturing and lack of accountability, contributed to the delay.
These breakdowns in communication aggravated an endeavor
that is intrinsically difficult to handle, due to the hazardous nature
of the material and its unique ability to inspire fear and distrust.
Poor handling of information by the government, bias of the
media, and lack of early public participation in the restoration
process exacerbated the public’s fear and distrust. As a result,
regulators at Spring Valley must confront two challenges:
physical cleanup and public suspicion.
A. Agencies’ Failures and Refusals to Effectively
Coordinate and Communicate
1. Intra-Agency: EPA/EPIC
Within the federal government, critically involved
agencies, such as EPA, did not share information within their
own operations. These failures to communicate information
prevented EPA from fully addressing the scope of the munitions
and chemical contamination in Spring Valley and thus from
protecting the community.
EPA’s complete deferral of responsibility for Spring
Valley to DOD in 1986 enabled a major communication failure
within EPA. EPA surrendered cleanup responsibility;175 with
that deferral, however, EPA washed its hands of the problem.
Though EPA’s photographic division, EPIC, had flagged
potential sites of concern, EPA surrendered cleanup
responsibility to the Corps and thus did not review EPIC’s
findings. When AU notified EPA of the contamination situation,
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EPA deferred to the Corps’ efforts. EPA did not pursue
investigation beyond the Corps’ findings or significantly review
those findings. Years later, EPA defended its lack of internal
communication by analogizing EPIC to a party contracting
with another separate party in a private agreement; this
arrangement, by EPA’s logic, did not require EPIC’s findings
to be communicated within EPA.176
2. Inter-Agency: EPA, Corps,
ATSDR, and D.C. Department of
Health
Inter-agency communication occurred but had little
effect. Communication between the Corps and EPA failed to
identify Spring Valley as a serious problem. Though the Corps
provided results to EPA, this communication was more of a
“check-box” requirement than a serious review and discussion.
In other inter-agency failures to effectively
communicate, agencies that questioned the review failed to raise
red flags. For example, the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (“ATSDR”) performed human health analyses
at the request of the D.C. Department of Health, who was
suspicious of the Corps’ 1995 declaration that no chemical
contamination existed. ATSDR also found no presence of
adverse health effects. ATSDR, however, used the Corps’
samples — the very samples that the D.C. Department of
Health questioned — and remarked that the Corps did not
test for the range of potentially degraded chemicals. ATSDR’s
communication was ineffective for the ultimate goal, protecting
human health, because the agency merely communicated in a
cursory manner rather than require more inquiry about questions
raised.
Inter-agency communication was also often
contentious. The Corps’ refusal to listen to another
governmental agency, the D.C. Department of Health, extended
the cleanup process by years. The Corps repeatedly dismissed
the suspicions of the D.C. Department of Health and its calls
for expanded testing with different methodologies. The lack
of formal means for communication between the experts from
the Corps, EPA, local government and the public regarding
the cleanup effort extended the contamination problem
unnecessarily.
3. Statutory Deference
Federal law allowed EPA to cede responsibility to the
Corps for cleanup efforts and thus not scrutinize the Corps’
findings and methodologies or EPA’s internal departmental
warnings.177 Because of statutory deference, EPA lightly
reviewed the Corps’ decision that no hazards were present in
1986, though EPIC had flagged sites as potential burial sites
and communicated these to the Corps.
Similar statutory deference allowed the Corps to use
the hierarchy of authority as a shield for its decisions. For
example, in 1996 the Corps, as the lead agency, was able to
refuse to investigate the D.C. Department of Health’s legitimate
concerns — and did so for two years, thus prolonging the
contamination.
4. Posturing
Focus on positions, rather than solutions, impeded
earlier and more successful results in Spring Valley. The Spring
Valley cleanup suffered from repeated, defensive posturing by
the Corps in reaction to accusations from the D.C. Department
of Health and to potential liability to other parties. This
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entrenched posturing frustrated effective solutions, damaged
the possibility of a consensus-based solution that would generate
overall acceptance, and destroyed community trust in public
institutions. Broad scientific input should have dominated the
Corps’ actions. Situations involving contamination are extremely
complex; they pose problems for experts trying to determine
hazards and appropriate responses. Because of the Corps’
posturing, the Corps and the D.C. Department of Health were
unable to effectively share experts’ information and work
toward solutions. Meetings held over two years were necessary
to persuade the Corps to act on the Department’s concerns.
Less focus on who had control and more focus on solutions
would have increased the rate and success of cleanup at Spring
Valley.
5. Lack of Accountability
The Corps’ lack of accountability for cleanup actions
before a stringent oversight authority allowed ineffective selfmonitoring at Spring Valley. Allowing the agency that caused
the problem to dictate cleanup prevents an objective third party
from ensuring the action is conducted thoroughly and
effectively. Fear of liability may drive the responsible agency
to minimally investigate the problem and thus perform an
inadequate cleanup. The agency lacks incentive to go beyond
necessary actions.
DOD oversees cleanup of contamination that the
Department caused through AUES.178 With only itself as a
monitor, the Corps did not fully investigate contamination issues
at Spring Valley in both 1986 and 1995. In both situations, the
Corps concluded its reviews prematurely despite lingering
suspicions of AU in 1986 and the D.C. Department of Health
in 1995.
Lack of self-monitoring also allowed EPA to defer
responsibility. When EPIC located possible contamination sites
and raised concerns to the Corps in 1986, the Corps chose to
ignore the findings. Told then of the findings, EPA had no
reaction. Years later, EPA defended its lack of internal
communication by arguing that EPA was not required to
monitor actions of its departments contracted to other
agencies.179 EPA’s intra-departmental lack of accountability
partially allowed this failure of communication.
Lack of accountability also contributed to information
mismanagement; mediocre searching by officials and losses of
records have affected the physical success of and the public’s
trust in the cleanup. Competent management of historical
records is crucial in situations such as Spring Valley, where
contamination occurred eighty years ago. Recently, a small group
of RAB members located records and photographs that have
dramatically expanded the scope of the investigation and
cleanup and altered the conceptual approach to the project,
from searching for pits to new types of searches.180 These
amateurs found the records at the National Archives during
their spare time, when expert Corps and Army archivists, whose
full-time charge has been finding AUES information, had not
located the documents. Meanwhile, records about Spring Valley
that the Corps possessed five years ago are now lost181 or
inaccessible.182

CONTINUED ON PAGE 16
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LITIGATION UPDATE
Climate Change’s Significant Impact on the
National Environmental Policy Act
By Dave Newman *
he United States government has spent billions of dollars
financing the construction of fossil fuel power plants,
oil fields and transmission pipelines across the globe
through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(“OPIC”) and the Export Import Bank (“Ex-Im”). These
projects have an enormous impact on the global environment,
as well as the local communities in which they are built. Some
of these effects, such as climate change, are already having a
significant impact on the environment in the United States.
Despite the significant domestic impact of federal actions
abroad, the OPIC and Ex-Im do not perform environmental
assessments mandated by the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) prior to funding a project. In a case filed recently
in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of
California, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the cities of
Boulder, Colorado and Oakland, California are seeking to
require them to conduct the mandated environmental
assessments.1
In 1969, Congress passed the NEPA in recognition
of “the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations
of all components of the natural environment.”2 NEPA
declares that environmental health must be an “essential
consideration” of federal policy.3 It requires that federal agencies
study the environmental impact of proposed actions, consider
possible alternatives and publicize their findings before the
project is allowed to commence. This precautionary step,
embodied in the process of drafting environmental impact
statements (“EIS”), enables decision makers, environmentalists
and the general public to thoughtfully consider the impact of
major actions undertaken by the federal government before
they become reality.
Over the past three decades, twenty-six states and
eighty-six countries have adopted laws similar to NEPA
requiring some form of environmental impact assessment.4
In addition, the United Nations Environment Programme has
adopted the principle of conducting environmental impact
assessments for major governmental actions and the European
Union has made it a requirement of state membership.5 The
practice of drafting an EIS is also endorsed in international
environmental agreements and declarations.6 However, U.S.
government actions abroad generally have not been subject to
NEPA’s environmental assessment requirement, despite the
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negative environmental consequences of such actions
throughout the world.
NEPA recognizes “the worldwide and long-range
character of environmental problems” and encourages the U.S.
to “lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and
programs designed to maximize international cooperation in
anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind’s
world environment” to the extent that it does not conflict with
U.S. foreign policy. 7 Courts have interpreted NEPA’s
extraterritorial application narrowly by limiting it to situations
where the action caused or was likely to cause direct impact on
the United States or on the global commons.8
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey9, NEPA was held
to apply to the National Science Foundation’s plans to incinerate
garbage in Antarctica. By contrast, in NEPA Coalition of Japan
v. Aspin10, the court refused to extend the extraterritorial rule
developed in Massey to include actions at U.S. military bases in
Japan.
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the City of
Boulder, Colorado are now testing the limits of these decisions
regarding NEPA’s extraterritorial application. They are seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief that would require OPIC and
Ex-Im to draft EIS for projects that they are considering
funding.
OPIC and Ex-Im have approved over $32 billion of
fossil-fuel projects throughout the world over the past ten
years.11 These projects will emit significantly more carbon
dioxide emissions through their lives than that released by the
worldwide consumption of petroleum, natural gas and coal in
the year 2000.12
Examples of these projects include:

•

•

Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: 650-mile petroleum pipeline
through Chad and Cameroon that is expected to
deliver approximately one billion barrels of oil and
will directly lead to estimated emissions of 424.7 million
metric tons of CO2.13
Hamaca Oil Project: $627 million loan guarantee by
the Ex-Im Bank for the development of Venezuelan
oil fields that will result in the extraction of 2.1 billion
barrels of oil releasing an estimated 891.2 million
metric tons of CO2.14
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•

Dezhou Coal-Fired Power Plant: loan guarantees by
the Ex-Im Bank to expand this Chinese power plant
will lead to an additional 177.5 million metric tons of
CO2 over its twenty-year life.15

None of these projects complied with NEPA despite
imposing a significant impact on the global climate and, in
turn, the United States. The complaint alleges that the Ex-Im
Bank and OPIC are in continual violation of NEPA for not
conducting environmental assessments to determine if any of
these individual projects, or their energy programs as a whole,
have a significant impact on the human environment of the
United States.16 The complaint also alleges violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act17 for failing to comply with
NEPA.18
FOR MORE INFO:

WWW.CLIMATELAWSUIT.ORG

CONTACTS:
MARK HELM, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, DIRECTOR, MEDIA
RELATIONS, 202-783-7400 X102, 202-270-3650 (CELL)
•
LEGAL EXPERT FOR COMMENT: JOHN ECHEVERRIA,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I NSTITUTE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 202-662-9850 X3

•
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The Enforcement of
Environmental Law
From a Human
Rights Perspective
By Romina Picolotti*and Sofia Bordenave**
Introduction
The objective of this article is to link the environment
and human rights at the level of domestic enforcement on the
part of States. We start from the basis that human rights law
provides substantive and procedural elements as well as
institutional mechanisms that can be incorporated by
environmental law with a view to achieving effective
environmental protection.
Even though the protection of the environment has
been consecrated in a number of international instruments and
universal recognition has been achieved concerning the need to
act in certain areas to prevent the destruction of the Earth, this
protection has been based more on rhetoric and good will
rather than on enforceability. International environmental law
has not provided the mechanisms necessary for individuals to
legally claim the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by States
in environmental treaties. We understand by environmental
enforcement, the ability to claim before a judge the fulfillment
of obligations and the realization of rights that concern the
protection of the environment.
For its part, international human rights law has made
significant advances with respect to enforcement. International
justice forums have been created where individuals may demand
that States fulfil their obligations and achieve realize rights found
in human rights treaties. Likewise, international human rights
law has succeded in penetrating the domestic legislation of
States through legislative reforms that recognize and promote
its application by local tribunals.
Environmental and human rights law have essential
points in common that enable the creation of a field of
cooperation between the two1:
- Both disciplines have deep social roots; even
though human rights law is more rooted within
the collective consciousness, the accelerated process
of environmental degradation is generating a new
“environmental consciousness”.
- Both are purposeful legal systems with objectives
of universal consent and of variable content, open
to reality and social changes. The contents of both
disciplines need be adapted to dynamic social
processes, their normative corpus must meet the
needs of each social era, with the objective of
fulfilling its protective ends.2
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-

Internationalization. The international community
has assumed the commitment to observe the
realization of human rights and respect for the
environment. Since the Second World War3, the
relationship beteween the State and individual has
become pertinent to the international community.
On the other hand, the phenomena brought on
by environmental degradation trascends political
boundaries and is of critical importance to the
preservation of world peace and security. The
protection of the environment is internationalized,
while the State-Planet Earth relationship becomes
a concern of the international community.
- Universalization. Both areas of law tend to
universalize their object of protection. Human
Rights are presented as universal and the protection
of the environment appears as everyone’s
responsibility.
The advancement of the relationship between human
rights and the environment would enable the incorporation of
human rights priciples within an environmental scope, such as
anti-discrimination standards, the need for social participation,
protection of vulnerable groups, etc. At the same time, the
human rights system would be stregthened by the incorporation
of environmental concerns, enabling the expansion of the scope
of human rights protection and generation of concrete solutions
for cases of abuse. 4 Finally, one of the most important
consequences, is to provide victims of environmental
degradation the possibility to access to justice. Given the present
absolute helplessness felt by victims of environmental
degradation, linking human rights and the environment brings
these victims closer to the mechanisms of protection that are
provided for by human rights law.
Enforcement of International Environmental Law and
Enforcement of International Human Rights Law
In actuality, the linkage between human rights and the
environment reveals itself clearly and irrefutably. Environmental
degradation severely affects the use and enjoyment of most
internationally recognized human rights. Thus, for example, the
right to life and to health, are critically affected by problems of
environmental degradation,5 the right to equality before the
law is affected by the disproportionate way in which certain
elements of the population bear environmental burdens, and
environmental discrimination. The right to work is also affected
by environmental conditions in the work place. In addition,
the right to property is affected by environmental degradation,
etc.6
Experience in the human rights arena has shown that
the way to make rights effective is to promote their
enforcement. It is timely to consider what elements made
possible advances in human rights enforcement and whether
these can be applied to environmental law.
The first element stems from the recognition that
human rights are fundamental rights: the possibility of social
cohabitation is given by the existence of norms and principles
that imply the conception of immutable values, of limits that
cannot be transgressed, of norms that are internalized within
the collective consciousness as unyielding pillars not subject to
controversies. Human rights are the trustees of this solid
normative nucleus.
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The second is the general consent with regard to these
rights, which crystallize legally on an international scale through
treaties and declarations with universal vocation and their
hierarchical constitutional incorporation into the domestic
judicial systems of States.
The third element resides in the possibility given
individuals to access justice and seek enforcement of human
rights norms and the application of specific substantive and
procedural human rights principles in concrete cases. This access
to justice is in itself a human right, of which people cannot be
deprived.
When these elements of enforcement are applied to
the scope of environmental law, it is possible to sustain, with
regard to the first of these elements, that the environmental
crisis threatens the viability and quality of life on the planet.
The fundamental nature of this problem is irrefutable. This
has generated the universal consent necessary to elevate the
protection of the environment before international public law.
Hence, the right to a healthy environment is beginning to be
recognized as a human right.7
The second element pertaining to enforcement of
human rights appears in environmental law in the sense that,
most constitutions that have been recently reformed incorporate
the protection of the environment, hence, assigning this
protection constitutional hierarchy. 8
It is the third element, dealing with access to justice
that has not yet been completed in the area of environmental
law; it prevents its enforcement, and thus, the full force and
effectiveness of environmental law.
The Role Played by the Individual in the Enforcement
of Environmental Law
The protection of the environment exceeds in many
instances, the capability of States’ administrative structure, which
is why it requires that individuals assume the role of monitoring
and protecting rights as well as duties.
The essential role of the individual resides in their ability
to make environmental law enforceable. This not only
promotes but also realizes protective legal action. Given the
destruction or the imminent destruction of the environment
that surrounds the individual, the individual aware of the
vertiable force that he/she posseses finds himself/herself
compelled and motivated to take action.
It is no small task to clarify the role of the individual,
therefore we will analyse what is the object of protection and
what is the practical implication of the exercise of this role.
The protection of the environment can be the product
of actions that are aimed at preventing or repairng damages
caused to an individual or group, or actions that are intended
to safeguard collective interests based on the right to a healthy
environment.
In the first case, there are directly affected persons
suffering a detriment to their rights due to environmental
problems; in the second, the environment is protected as a
public good, and because it is of social interest.
Therefore, when we refer to environmental protection,
we face two legal objects that are interdependent: on the one
hand, the environment as an autonomous legal object that can
be protected, and on the other, the scope of human rights that
are affected by environmental damage or degradation9. As
individuals we have two objects to protect: the environment as
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an autonomous legal object and the human being 10. The
interdependence is clear, since the final object of protection is
always the human person, environmental law naturally integrates
with human rights law.
We now seek to elucidate the second question, that is,
what is the practical implication of exercising the individual’s
role of protecting the environment?
It is impossible for the individual to perform his/her
role if he/she is not complemented by specific duties imposed
on persons or agents to ensure their execution. If there are no
defined duties imposed on specific persons to ensure access to
justice in environmental matters, then the individual’s role
dissipates.
The individual’s task will not be fulfilled if the State
does not implement appropriate and effective mechanisms to
access justice. This is what Kant defined as “the perfect duty”,
contrary to “the imperfect duty” which is general, ambiguous
and non-compulsive. The current vision of environmental law
generates imperfect duties. An integral vision that links these
duties with the concept of access to justice contained in human
rights law is what will enable us to move from imperfection to
perfection or, in other words, from the lack of enforcement
to the achievement of enforcement. 11
Conclusion
The effectiveness of environmental law treaties
depends to a large extent on the impact that they have on the
domestic law of the party States. The party States have the
obligation, emanating from a general principle of international
law, to take all measures necessary to ensure the effective
protection of the rights consecrated in these treaties.
Yet, the fulfillment of the individual’s role of protecting
the environment depends not only on already existing
constitutional or legislative provisions, but also requires that
States train individuals under their jurisdiction on the exercise
of this role, and take legislative and administrative measures in
ways to eliminate obstacles, gaps, and facilitate access to justice.
Limited enforcement action at the local level and a
lack of effectiveness puts us on the alert with regard to the
utilization of existing procedural tools on the part of the
individual and highlights the need to create new tools. Proper,
adequate, efficient, and innovative procedural instruments
suitable for preserving the environment, sanctioning abusive
attitudes concerning the environment, and imposing an integral
remedy for damage caused are required. There is a need for
tools that will be used against inoperative, negligent or
accomplice States and against particular irresponsable
contaminators. We must make available prompt, simple actions
that will work to prevent environmentally destructive behavior.
These mechanisms must incorporate the principles of active
legitimacy (legal capacity), burden of proof, and the
precautionary principle, etc. In short, actions are needed that
ensure the human right of the individual to access justice in
environmental cases.
Finally, we recall that the fulfilment of the State
obligation to provide adequate and effective procedural tools
in the environmental field generates the liability of the State for
the violation of human rights that compose the concept of
access to justice at an international level. This opens a new field
of enforcement in environmental law and its victims against
FALL / WINTER 2003

States, namley international and regional systems of human
rights protection.
Translated by Maria-Candela Conforti
For more information on the Center for Human Rights and
the Environment see: www.cedha.org.ar
(Footnotes)
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PRACTITIONER’S CORNER
A Conversation With Earth Rights
International’s Rick Herz
Interview by Roxanne Sher-Skelton
ick Herz is an international environmental and human
rights advocate and the author of the widely read and
much acclaimed article “Litigating Environmental Abuses
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment” (40
Va. J. Int’l L. 545). He is the Litigation Director of Earth
Rights International (ERI) where he divides his time between
groundbreaking litigation and providing advice to human rights
and environmental activists on international law. He is an expert
on using the Alien Torts Claim Act to bring cases in United
States’ courts when transnational corporations abuse the
environment abroad.

R

SDLP: Who founded ERI?
Herz: ERI was founded by Tyler Giannini, Ka Hsaw Wa,
and Katie Redford. Tyler and Katie went to the University of
Virginia School of Law with me and focused on human rights
law. Katie had spent some time teaching in Burmese refugee
camps in Thailand before attending law school. Ka Hsaw Wa
is a member of the Karen ethnic nationality in Burma, and has
been a human rights activist since he fled Burma in 1988. He is
a recipient of the highly esteemed Goldman Environmental
Prize. He has also won both the Reebok Human Rights Award
and the Conde Nast Environmental Award.
SDLP: What are the goals of ERI?
Herz: ERI is committed to the idea that human rights and
environmental protection are fundamentally interrelated and
works to promote links between both fields. Repression of
indigenous people during development projects has allowed
polluters to harm the environment without dissent and the
resulting environmental degradation has caused terrible human
suffering.
SDLP: Do you think that there is a human right to a healthy
environment?
Herz: Yes. International law has come to recognize a right to
a minimally adequate environment. When environmental
degradation is so severe that the environment can no longer
sustain the people who live in the area, their resulting loss of
health and life amounts to human rights abuse.
SDLP: Tell us about what ERI is doing to advocate for the
environment and human rights.
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Herz: ERI has a multifaceted and creative plan of attack.
For example, we are co-counsel in several major lawsuits, we
do human rights monitoring of development projects in
Burma, we run a school in Thailand where we train indigenous
people to be human rights and environmental activists and we
have replicated the school in the Amazon.
SDLP: What lawsuits are you involved with?
Herz: Currently, ERI is co-counsel in four lawsuits. In Doe v.
Unocal Corp., ERI represents Burmese peasants who suffered
human rights abuses by Burmese army units that were securing
a Unocal gas pipeline. The abuses were egregious, including
forced relocation, forced labor, rape, torture, and murder. In
September of this year, we received a landmark ruling from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Court
concluded that corporations can be held legally responsible
under the Alien Tort Claims Act if they aid and abet violations
of international human rights norms in foreign countries. The
Court also found that we had presented enough evidence that
Unocal aided and abetted the Burmese military’s abuses to
survive summary judgment.
This ruling follows on the heels of a June 11, 2002
ruling in our companion state case against Unocal, in which a
California Superior Court held that we had submitted enough
evidence that Unocal’s project hired the military to survive
summary judgment. The state case is now headed for trial in
February 2003. The state court’s decision makes the case against
Unocal the first in U.S. history in which a corporation will stand
trial for human rights abuses committed abroad.
SDLP: Tell us about the other three cases.
Herz: In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the plaintiffs are
charging that Royal Dutch/Shell oil group was complicit in
human rights abuses in Nigeria. The particular abuses at issue
are the November 10, 1995 hangings of environmental and
community leaders Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, the
arbitrary detention of Owens Wiwa, and the shooting of a
woman who was peacefully protesting the bulldozing of her
crops in preparation for a Shell pipeline by Nigerian troops
called in by Shell.
In Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp. the plaintiffs are also
indigenous to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. They seek
redress for the shooting of peaceful protestors at Chevron’s
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Parabe offshore platform and the destruction of two villages
by soldiers in Chevron helicopters and boats. Bowoto and Wiwa
are good examples of one particular way in which human
rights and environmental protection are inextricably intertwined.
In both cases, the Nigerian military committed abuses
specifically to suppress peaceful protests against Chevron and
Shell’s destruction of the environment.
In Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., residents of Bhopal,
India, have filed suit against Union Carbide for toxic pollution
and contamination from a Union Carbide pesticide plant. This
is the same infamous plant that leaked poisonous gas, killing
over 5,000 people in 1984.
ERI has also submitted amicus briefs in several cases
including Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, in which victims of human
rights and environmental abuses associated with a massive mine
in Indonesia filed suit against the U.S. company that operated
the mines; Arias v. DynCorp, in which thousands of Ecuadorian
villagers harmed by the spraying of toxic herbicides by a
contractor for the U.S. government’s anti-narcotics program in
Colombia sued the contractor; and Jota v. Texaco and Aguinda v.
Texaco, a suit filed by residents of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian
Amazon who were harmed by massive pollution from
Texaco’s oil operations.
SDLP: Your article, “Litigating Environmental Abuses Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment” maps out
how to bring these types of cases, can you give a quick summary
for our readers?
Herz: This article demonstrates that some victims of
environmental abuses caused by transnational corporations may
have strong claims in U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The article reviews voluminous sources of international
law and shows how they establish norms of customary
international law that plaintiffs can rely on to bring ATCA claims
for redress of egregious environmental devastation. It explains
that plaintiffs in appropriate circumstances may have claims
asserting the right to life, the right to a healthy environment,
crimes against humanity, race discrimination, genocide and
cultural genocide. The article also discusses many of the
arguments corporate defendants have used to try to dismiss
ATCA environmental and human rights cases.
SDLP: Almost every case you mentioned involves an oil
company. Are they all bad?
Herz: I don’t know if they are ALL bad, but it is
unfortunately, true that here are lots of examples of oil
companies being complicit in human rights abuses and harming
the environment and a number of lawsuits have been filed.
SDLP: What effects are these cases having on corporate
behavior?
Herz: It is difficult to know what effect these lawsuits are
having in boardrooms. We know corporations follow these
cases closely, but will it affect their actions? We don’t know if
they are passing up opportunities or being more careful about
the way they implement projects because of human rights and
environmental concerns. But I would have to believe there is a
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strong deterrent effect. It is important to note though that
litigation, is not the only tool for pressuring corporations. Public
pressure, both here and abroad, plays an important role. Shell
and Chevron for example are facing serious protests from the
ethnic groups in the regions that they have chosen to develop.
SDLP: What is the biggest problem you face in your work?
Herz: I think the biggest problem is aa corporate culture
that assumes the corporation can act with impunity, and that is
willing to give a higher priority to its project than the lives of
local people.
SDLP: Tell us about ERI’s work in Burma.
Herz: ERI has an incredible program on the Thai-Burma
border monitoring abuses and training human rights and
environmental activists. For years, he military regime in Burma
has used the forced labor of its indigenous people to help
build development projects that destroy Burma’s natural
resources. Citizens are also often forced to relocate without
compensation, and they have suffered rape, torture and death
at the hands of the soldiers forcing them to work or relocate.
ERI trains local activists to go into Burma and monitor human
rights and environmental abuses. ERI distributes the
information that activists gather around the world. Hopefully
international attention will someday bring democracy to Burma.
SDLP: What are your thoughts on the recent World Summit
on Sustainable Development? Do you think it was an effective
conference?
Herz: I really don’t know.
SDLP: Many of the corporations being sued by ERI and
others for human rights and environmental abuses abroad are
household names in the U.S. Why do so few Americans seem
outraged about the things that some of our most familiar
corporations are doing to people throughout the world?
Herz: Largely because I think most Americans simply don’t
know about the kind of human rights abuses and environmental
devastation these companies are inflicting. If they did, I have
no doubt they would be appalled. I don’t think most Americans
want their gasoline to be produced from the blood and tears
of villagers in the developing world.
SDLP: How can students get involved?
Herz: Here in Washington we have law student interns every
semester and in the summer. We also have legal interns in our
Thailand office.

FOR MORE INFORMATION ON EARTHRIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL:
WWW.EARTHRIGHTS.ORG
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CONTINUED FROM PAGE 9
B. Nature and Handling of the Hazard
Toxic contamination sparks intense public fear and
distrust in institutions.183 Residents of Spring Valley suffer from
this fear and distrust, caused by the nature of the hazard, its
resulting effects on risk perception, and the way agencies and
the media have addressed the situation.
1. Toxic Contamination, Fear, and
Perceived Risk
Toxic substances trigger fear because they are a “new
species of trouble”; they are not natural but rather are manmade,
often technological, and thus preventable.184 Toxins contaminate
and infiltrate; they usually act insidiously rather than directly.185
The dread they create remains long after an incident is declared
over by an official, for contamination incidents have no
demarcated beginnings and endings — for victims, the incident
may never be “over.”186 The damage may continue, invisible
and unknown.187 Contaminated land becomes “alive with
dangers, a terrain in which fresh air and sunshine and all the
other benevolences of creation are to be feared as sources of
toxic infection.”188 Toxic invasion of homes, whose security
has been integral to American culture, has violative effect.189
Laypeople often differ from experts in their evaluation
of risks in toxic contamination situations.190 Though experts
criticize the public as perceiving risk under the influence of
cognitive errors, heuristics and factual misunderstandings, the
public often derives its perceptions from a legitimate, though
different, framework of values.191 Experts and government
agencies are more likely to employ risk assessment and
characterize risks in terms of annual mortality and morbidity,
whereas laypeople base their perceptions on a range of features
which focus on the nature of the harm.192 Perceived risk
increases if the danger is involuntary, is unobservable, is new,
inspires dread, inequitably distributes risks and benefits among
generations, has catastrophic potential, has fatal consequences,
has delayed harmful effects or allows unknowing exposure.193
Toxic and nuclear hazards, which particularly possess these
features, register the greatest differences on the layperson’s versus
the expert’s perceptions of risk.
Spring Valley residents suffer this dread and fear, caused
by buried explosives and chemicals, substances which for the
residents are invisible, involuntary and seemingly random.
Adding to the residents’ fear is outrage that this harm was
preventable, and now a remedy is not in citizens’ control.
Homeowners’ attitudes have changed since 1993, when residents
trusted the Corps and possessed greater concern for their
property values than for the cleanup process.194 Now residents
cycle between a “creeping fear,” marked by hypochondria and
concern for the soil and water, and “reality checks,” instigated
by the fact that residents have no tangible evidence to cause
fear or reassurance.195
Rather than a place of refuge, homes in Spring Valley
have become a source of fear. Residents voice concerns about
the health and safety for themselves and their children.196 These
worries grow as the Corps requests homeowners not to blow
leaves or mow grass and to avoid stirring up dust,197 while the
Department of Health advises residents to minimize contact
with soil, avoid wading in creeks, and avoid eating home-grown
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vegetables — usually the epitome of health.198 Spring Valley
“[p]arents wonder if their gardens are safe for their children to
play in and if their home-grown vegetables are safe to eat.”199
Some residents may pay thousands of dollars for soil testing.200
Findings of elevated arsenic levels at AU’s Child Development
Center, where children play outside in the soil, added to these
fears. Indeed, children may be at greater risk because their
bodies are less efficient at converting arsenic into less harmful
organic forms.201 AU students share the sense of fear as well.202
“Mostly, people worry: When will it all be over? When will we
feel secure again?”203
2. Distrust in Institutions
A related feature of toxic incidents is a loss of trust in
institutions. Toxic contamination may cause loss of confidence
in officials and experts, who may either not tell the truth or
who may not be scientifically able to tell the truth.204 Trust is
fragile; it is difficult to achieve yet easy to lose.205 Several factors
lead to this fragility: (1) negative incidents have a greater impact
than positive occurrences because negative incidents are usually
more discrete and visible; (2) negative news events have a greater,
negative impact on public trust than positive events;206 (3) sources
of negative news are perceived as more credible than positive
news; and (4) distrust reinforces distrust, by causing the public
to avoid interaction with those they distrust and by affecting
the publics’ views of events.207
Such loss has occurred in Spring Valley. Trust in
government’s ability to act eroded quickly after the start of
Operation Safe Removal. In the initial phase, the head of a
local real estate company stated, “‘I think it’s temporary, and
they’ll correct it.… It will be gone and forgotten within a
month.’”208 Two years later, however, residents were asking,
“‘Will we ever be sure this place is totally clear of munitions?’”209
Trust has not returned. This stems from the
government’s inability to solve the problem and from the
public’s realization that the government concealed the problem.
Even a district court found that “[t]he Army in this case created
the hazard and literally ‘covered it up.’”210 An outraged RAB
member recently professed he “has suspicions about the Corps’
integrity and honesty — that’s not expected from an arm of
the U.S. government, and I don’t think the Corps is trying to
remedy the distrust.”211 In 2001, residents testified to Congress
about their distrust in the Army’s ability to fully disclose
contamination problems and to detect buried munitions and
chemical material.212 The suspicion is so deeply rooted that
Spring Valley residents are requesting both an official government
certificate of clearance of hazards that would convey with the
deed to each property and provide indemnification for each
property owner and insurance for liability for the work of
government contractors.213
Ironically, though trust in the Corps has faltered, trust
in other institutions such as the judicial system remains. This
faith harks back to the expert/lay distinction. Residents of
Spring Valley are largely familiar with and comfortable assuming
control of situations; they are expert politicians, lawyers, doctors
and other powerful figures. The plethora of past and pending
lawsuits can be attributed to an odd combination of “expertise”
and thus trust in their realms, plus a layperson’s desire to obtain
control over an involuntary situation, the contamination.
Bringing suits enables residents to use their expertise to seize
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control over a situation they feel violated by and powerless to
effect.
3. Biased Media
The media play an important role in the public’s
perception of risk.214 The media tend to report more negative,
trust-destroying news than positive events.215 Bias, combined
with the greater impact of negative news over positive news,
the increased credibility of negative news sources, the greater
ability of interest groups to manipulate the media, and the
inherent fragility of trust, is likely to breed distrust.216
Multiple media have covered the affairs at Spring
Valley. National and local newspapers, television broadcasts
and magazines have informed the public about the ongoing
hazards and cleanup efforts, often with a sensationalist slant.217
Until 2001, this bias may have been warranted, for the federal
agencies involved were ineffective in handling the
contamination. Since then, the bias has increased the atmosphere
of distrust. Some members of the community are dismayed
about the negative bias of national newspaper coverage now
that cleanup is in a new phase;218 they feel that many articles
emphasize views of residents who are not representative of
the community, omit positive information about the cleanup,
and focus on more pessimistic aspects.219 Such negative press
may be detrimental to residents who have concern about
property values and who focus on the future rather than the
past.220
C. Lack of Empowered Public
Participation
Inability to participate in cleanup decisions, which affect
present and future health and property, exacerbates affected
citizens’ senses of fear and distrust. Thus, authorities handling
toxic contamination must consider impact on the public.
Unfortunately, Spring Valley residents long lacked a formal
voice in the Corps’ handling of the remediation, an absence
that eroded trust in the Corps and its efforts. In the 1993 to
1995 cleanup, a technical review committee (“TRC”) existed
but included only one member of the community.221 Not until
April 2001, eight years after the public became aware of the
contamination, did the Corps institute a RAB for the area.222
Though the RAB included more members of the community,
the group was not empowering. Participating residents felt
that it functioned as a retroactive sounding board, rather than a
heeded forum for opinions of appointed neighborhood
representatives.223 For example, the Corps completed soil
sampling before the RAB could discuss the plan and offer
input.224 The RAB itself has been uncertain about its role;
members cite their lack of experts and wonder if it should
function as an independent overseer or should bring in outside
expert overseers.225 Some of the RAB’s uncertainty stems from
its advisory status.226 The Corps has told the RAB that “the
Corps has no obligation to … respond to a RAB request.”227
The RAB’s powerless status in the Spring Valley cleanup erodes
confidence about its role. Repeated failure by the Army to
cure the contamination problem, compounded by the Army’s
false reassurances of successful remediation, caused citizens’
distrust of government.228 The RAB, with its lack of proactive
power, cannot cure this distrust.
D. Funding
Financing cleanup is a major problem confronting
remediation at all formerly used defense sites (“FUDS”).
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Budgets for FUDS restoration, already meager, will be reduced
as defense spending priorities shift to counter-terrorism
measures.229 FUDS often pose dual threats, toxic chemicals
and unexploded ordnance (“UXO”), munitions that fail to
detonate on firing ranges and pose hazards to later users of
the land. Both threats are present in Spring Valley.
Approximately 2000 formerly used defense sites require UXO
remediation, and treatment is necessary at many active ranges
as well. Costs for remediation are prohibitive, making the
process delayed and uncertain.230 Most funds go to cleaning or
closing active bases, rather than remediating former defense
sites; of the $1.5 billion that the DOD spends to clean up
defense sites, only $200 million is designated to FUDS.231 The
quality of remediation is uncertain as well. Though advanced
technology to locate UXO is available, lack of funding prevents
the Corps from employing such technology.232 Additionally,
unexpected discoveries, such as those being unearthed at Spring
Valley, can significantly escalate costs; since 1997, the Corps’
estimate for the Spring Valley cleanup has increased by nearly
600%, from $21 million to $125.1 million.233 In spring 2002,
the Army designated an additional allocation of $5.2 million
to the Corps’ Spring Valley effort.234 Spring Valley, however,
already receives more funding than other sites in its region.
Spring Valley receives 86% of its region’s funds — 8% of the
national FUDS budget.235 Other projects are on hold or shut
down because funds have been diverted to Spring Valley.236
Still, the Spring Valley cleanup will take years and require more
funding. Other sources of funding are not viable. EPA does
not typically contribute funds to cleanups already receiving
money designated by Congress to the Army,237 and the D.C.
Department of Health, whose budget is minimal, already relies
on funds from DOD to perform some functions.238 Though
a shorter timeline increases the amount of funding needed,
Spring Valley citizens’ motto is “Finish in four years.”239
The problems at Spring Valley — the government’s
failures and refusals to interact and communicate on various
levels; the public fear and distrust created by the nature of the
danger, the government’s and media’s handling of the situation,
the lack of public participation, and inadequate funding — are
complex. These problems, however, are endemic to
bureaucracies and hazardous contamination situations. New
approaches and solutions may help communities such as Spring
Valley achieve more timely and successful results in the
restoration process.
IV. Approaches to Break the Cycle
New approaches and structures may alleviate some
of the problems that have continually plagued Spring Valley’s
cleanup. To increase interaction and oversight both within
agencies and between agencies, statutory provisions and formal
communication forums may be effective. Emphasis on the
role of local governments may also boost successful cleanup
endeavors, because local governments are privy to both citizens’
concerns and special community knowledge such as health
effects. Employing a group of experts to work together and
make consensus-based decisions may reduce posturing and
increase communication, thus producing effective cleanup
strategies. Finally, cleanup strategies must embrace early and
empowered public participation.
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A. Increasing Interaction
1. EPA Oversight for Residential
FUDS
A system intended to protect the environment and
public health would require levels of close review by an outside
and more experienced agency. Currently, the law only requires
DOD to consult with EPA and to notify EPA of final plans
and work action in a timely manner.240 No requirement of
review is specified. Because EPA has more expertise restoring
the environment and contaminated residential communities,
EPA should be required to exercise oversight in DOD cleanup
actions. This could be accomplished by a change in the
requirements of CERCLA and DERP or by formal
agreements.241
At residential FUDS such as Spring Valley, a
relationship that designates DOD as the lead authority and
gives EPA more stringent oversight would allow each agency
to exercise its expertise. Spring Valley’s remediation involves
two particular aspects: community health and munitions
recovery. For sites involving ordnance cleanup, DOD, through
agencies such as the Corps, should propose and undertake
cleanup; the Corps is more qualified to review munitions and
related concerns than EPA. EPA, however, draws from
broader experience regarding community cleanups and is more
skilled at investigating chemical hazards and interacting with
the public. This expertise is particularly pertinent regarding
contamination in communities, where human health is at risk
and fear may be prevalent. The human element is often absent
in DOD-driven cleanups, which primarily involve land with
no specified future residential use or FUDS that do not contain
chemical weapons. EPA can draw on its community cleanup
experience to help DOD formulate successful approaches to
such situations, from developing non-disruptive logistical plans
to maintaining public trust.
Closer EPA review of DOD-sponsored cleanup
actions could also help prevent ineffective self-monitoring by
those DOD agencies. Outside, attentive review of cleanup
plans and progress would motivate DOD to fully investigate
and address the range of possible contamination and the public’s
concerns.
Amending the language of CERCLA and DERP to
incorporate a requirement that EPA fully review and approve
DOD cleanup actions in residential communities, while still
allowing DOD primary cleanup and decision-making authority,
could address this problem. Statutory changes, however, are
subject to the inertia of Congress and may be difficult to achieve
in a timely fashion.
A less onerous approach to EPA oversight is necessary.
Formal agreements between EPA and DOD for cleanups of
residential communities may create effective EPA review. These
agreements would allow parties to have flexibility regarding
the level of oversight and thus devise effective cleanup plans
more quickly.242 Such agreements could be similar to those in
the DSMOA program that states sign with the DOD or EPA
for funding in cleanup situations.243
The failed inter- and intra-agency interactions at Spring
Valley strengthen this proposition of close EPA review. At
Spring Valley, a statutory requirement for EPA examination of
Corps’ actions in residential defense sites may have prevented
EPA’s deference to the DOD and the resulting approval of
18

the Corps’ 1986 “issue closed” finding. As seen in Spring Valley,
land use over time can be multiple, unforeseen, and forgotten.
Expansion of residential communities, however, is certain; as
populations increase and suburbs expand, conflicts in land uses
will increase. Though Spring Valley is the first known chemically
contaminated FUDS in a residential area, other similar sites
may either be created unknowingly or currently exist. Moreover,
current, non-residential, chemically contaminated FUDS need
to be properly remediated for future community use. In such
community-oriented remediation plans, close EPA review
would help achieve successful results for protecting human
health and the environment.
2. Formal Inter-Agency and IntraAgency Communication Forums
In addition to formal agreements, formal partnerships
or communication forums between and within agencies could
foster successful cleanups through more communication, less
posturing and more accountability. Agencies involved in a
residential FUDS cleanup could be required by law to meet on
a regular basis to exchange information and ideas. These
meetings, which would involve all parties early in the process,
may also reduce the posturing that becomes entrenched by
time. Such forums would encourage accountability to other
agencies; agencies would find it more difficult to deflect
responsibility to another party or ignore findings when that
agency must report regularly to others. A requirement for
consensual decisions prior to action would strengthen the
respect of the agencies for each other’s positions and the public’s
respect for the agencies.
At Spring Valley, this requirement may have reduced
the Corps’ posturing and refusal to heed the D.C. Department
of Health’s concerns. Similarly, EPA would not have been
able to ignore the findings of EPIC, either within its own
organization or before the other agencies.
B. Emphasizing the Role of Local Governments
Local governments have a particular role to play in
such partnerships and should not be omitted. Local
governments often hear citizens’ concerns first. Thus, local
governments can voice concerns about which federal agencies
lack knowledge or interest. Because they are better positioned
to perceive their citizens’ interests, local governments are better
able to protect those concerns, such as contamination or
property values.
Similarly, local communities and governments may
possess special knowledge, such as colloquial information about
health problems, that federal agencies lack. Without receiving
input from local governments and seriously considering that
information, federal agencies compromise their ability to create
efficient and comprehensive solutions. Though local
governments often can contribute positively to the cleanup
process, they also often lack funding or stature to make their
voices heard. Thus, agencies must ensure an active role for
local governments in the decision-making process.
Increased, mandatory attention to local concerns and
information would have assisted the timely and efficient cleanup
of Spring Valley. The Corps now admits that the “D.C.
Department of Health has a little bit better perspective on
[information],” because “[t]hey’ve received more anecdotal
information from the community than we have.”244 In Spring
Valley, the community and local government possessed
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information that seemed suspicious but no formal
communication forum existed to share these concerns. Though
the D.C. Department of Health questioned human health effects
based partly on its awareness of mysterious illnesses in the
area, the federal government ignored these concerns. For
example, though family members who formerly lived at one
of the most highly contaminated sites died of cancers and
suffered from debilitating rashes, the Corps treated the situation
as an isolated incident and told the family that the site contained
no elevated levels of chemicals.245 If the federal government
had treated local government more seriously and considered
its information about local health problems, the Corps may
have detected the arsenic problem that it found years later —
notably, a discovery prompted by repeated prodding of a local
government agency, the D.C. Department of Health. Likewise,
the Corps’ refusal to acknowledge the concerns of and
information possessed by the D.C. Department of Health
regarding the Corps’ 1995 investigation and conclusion delayed
cleanup. Giving local governments more active roles and taking
municipalities’ concerns and knowledge seriously could aid
successful results.
A local government’s obligation and ability to perceive
citizens’ concerns depends on how successfully citizens make
those concerns known. In these respects, Spring Valley’s protests
and the subsequent local and federal government responses
may be anomalous. Spring Valley’s upper-class status makes its
residents a politically powerful population. One of D.C.’s major
employers and taxpayers, AU, also has a stake in the action.
These citizens, well-educated and comfortable with institutions,
are fully able to voice their concerns, and the D.C. government
has great incentive to represent these citizens’ interests. Even
the federal government responded to AU; President Reagan
and the Secretary of Defense granted the university a private
audience and granted its request that the Army bear remediation
costs despite waivers for liability and indemnification in the
1917 and 1918 leases.246
Situations involving less affluent residents, however,
may not yield the same result. Communities suffering from
toxic contamination are often poor and composed of
minorities, who usually have minimal political clout.247 A
requirement for local governments to be more active in
developing cleanup solutions could force unresponsive local
governments to consider citizens’ concerns in order to present
them to federal agencies.
C. Implementing Consensus-Based Expert
Groups
Formal creation of a neutral group of experts charged
with reaching consensus may help achieve successful cleanups
and alleviate the public’s loss of trust. To be sure experts address
all angles of the problem and that the solution receives general
support, federal agencies with primary authority could employ
such working groups of experts. This group of experts would
focus on science, and their scope would include community
concerns. Such a group, with an emphasis on solutions rather
than agency agendas, could also introduce additional expertise
and prevent posturing. Such a group may actually achieve
cleanup solutions and rebuild residents’ trust in the government’s
ability to solve the problem.
This consensus-based, group approach has been
successfully employed in other contamination cleanup situations,
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notably in the Massachusetts Military Reservation (“MMR”)
remediation efforts in the 1990s.248 At this contaminated former
military base seventy miles south of Boston, a group of
detached experts developed a workable cleanup plan in two
months, when DOD could not do so for years.249 For more
than fifty years, the military disposed of hazardous wastes such
as toxic fuels, acids and laboratory chemicals at MMR by
pouring them on the ground or into unlined pits.250 Though
these disposal methods were acceptable at the time, the wastes
leached into the water supplies of surrounding communities.251
Eventually, EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List.252
DOD generated multiple cleanup plans which were
plagued by new discoveries of contamination and intense public
disapproval.253 As a result, the local government and citizens,
who had participated in advisory boards and waited over a
decade for a solution, lost trust in the federal government’s
ability to solve the problem.254 To develop an acceptable
cleanup plan, DOD, EPA, and the Massachusetts Department
of Environmental Protection created the Technical Review and
Evaluation Team (“TRET”), an “ad hoc think tank” composed
of scientists from various agencies and from disciplines absent
in the original plan, such as ecology and risk assessment.255
Though its focus was science-based solutions, the TRET sought
input from public representatives, regulatory agencies, the
military, the public, contractors, and local government
throughout the evaluation and analysis process.256 This inclusion
in the decision-making process increased the decision’s
legitimacy.257 The ability of each member to interact personally
within the group also minimized position-staking and helped
resolve inter-group conflicts.258 As a result, the TRET’s solutions
were comprehensive, accepted by all parties, and achieved
quickly.259
In the Spring Valley cleanup effort, a neutral expert
group that required consensus and included scientists from
involved agencies and outside experts could have positively
impacted the cleanup effort. Pooling experts from the Corps,
EPA and local government, and involving the public and
contractors could have produced more efficient results by
increasing available information, reducing posturing and
encouraging public acceptance. The group could have
addressed concerns, such as those of the D.C. Department of
Health, from a scientific perspective rather than adversarial
political or legal standpoints. By interacting on the same level
and sharing the same goal, the group’s members would not be
able to avoid issues by referring to hierarchical schemes of
authority. Tasking these experts with the same goal of
determining a solution as a group rather than defending their
institutions’ agendas could unite these experts and thus yield
better results.
D. Empowering Community Participation
Communities should be integrally involved in
remediation processes to ensure acceptance of outcomes, foster
trust in the results, and avoid later costs spent defending
decisions.260 Our nation’s history and spirit support this notion.
Our country was founded as a participatory democracy, and
our culture emphasizes our ability to influence law and
outcomes.261 Charges of “democratic elitism” may afflict
bureaucracies that make decisions without considering the
affected citizens.262 Decision-making structures that circumvent
democratic processes and fail to consider concerns and risks
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held by stakeholders are likely to fail,263 while structures that
empower citizens with decision-making power and educate
the public about present hazards enable successful outcomes.
Such strategies are more likely to produce results that the public
accepts, that increase trust in officials, and that increase overall
cultural well-being. Effective participation returns to the public
some sense of control over their destinies that toxic
contamination strips away.264 Moreover, long-term cultural
costs from toxic incidents when the public does not accept the
outcome may far exceed monetary amounts for damages and
numbers of immediate deaths.265 Thus, groups who seek to
devise and implement cleanup strategies for hazardous
contamination situations should seek extensive public
participation, ideally through both structural inclusion and
educational programs.
The experience at MMR provides some examples of
public participation, which could be expanded and
supplemented by other solutions. The TRET, the expert group
at MMR, employed strategies of citizen participation and
education in its search for a cleanup solution.266 While focusing
on a science-based solution that would ultimately solve the
public’s frustrations, the TRET incorporated significant public
participation and education.267 The TRET sought community
opinion in weekly outreach meetings, allowing the group to
consider and incorporate local citizens’ concerns and special
knowledge into feasible solutions.268 In public hearings, experts
sought to both learn from and educate the public.269 This
interaction altered the public’s conventional views of scientists
as unapproachable authorities270 and perhaps also the public’s
perception of risk, by narrowing the expert/layperson gap.271
1. Democratic Decision-Making
Structures
The TRET recognized that input from the public is
crucial to acceptance of outcomes.272 Public participation in
decisions about risk should be more expansive and include
more decision-making authority. For successful democratic
participation, the group should: (1) share power in the decisionmaking process;273 (2) encompass a diverse set of viewpoints;274
(3) be open;275 (4) employ fair procedures;276 and (5) possess a
clear mission.277 Selection criteria should be statutory, relevant
to the cleanup at issue, and publicly known.278 The RAB at
Spring Valley possesses several of these characteristics279 but
lacks decision-making power. Even the RAB’s name indicates
its mere advisory function.280 For the RAB to feel truly
empowered and like a full participant, it should share decisionmaking authority, at least on a consensus-oriented basis.281
2. Educational Strategies
Citizens cannot fully participate in democratic structures
unless they understand the issues before them.282 Education
reduces the threat of decisions based on factual
misunderstandings, faulty heuristics, cognitive errors or other
factors that affect the public’s perception of risk.283 Instituting
a program that seeks to educate private citizens could boost
democratic participation and enable local citizens’ trust in
solutions. For educational endeavors to be effective, the public
must trust the information provider; thus, risk communication
by government entities who the public already distrusts may
fail.284 On the other hand, providing educational opportunities
to citizens may empower them and increase trust in government.
Moreover, education can increase timeliness and efficiency of
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solutions. By enabling citizens’ shifts in risk perception through
exposure to other, more objective views of risk, education
may change residents’ requirements for a “successful”
remediation; local citizens may decide that a zero-contamination
level of remediation is not necessary. Thus, a timelier and more
economically efficient, yet acceptable, outcome is possible.
Spring Valley residents want to be educated and
involved in the cleanup proceedings.285 Increased interaction
with scientists, such as in the TRET, could shift local residents’
understanding of risk. Education of scientists, government
representatives and local citizens about each groups’ views of
the problem would aid understanding of each position and
assist creation of outcomes that are agreeable to all.
Government grants for outside technical assistance for
education are another avenue to increase public participation.286
Such grants allow objective review of data that may be
provided by self-interested industries yet used by agencies in
deciding their cleanup plans.287 Thus, outside scientific assistance
can help counteract past secrecy or distrust by providing citizens
with objective views.288
From a statutory stance, funding for outside technical
assistance should be simplified and expanded. Applications
for federal grants such as TAPP or TAG289 should be made
easier to complete and understand, so all communities — not
just well-educated neighborhoods — can receive grants. Limits
on the grants’ monetary ceilings should be raised as well. For
TAPP grants, available funds should be increased from the
current $25,000 limit or the requirement that the funding come
from the same pool as that for other RAB activities eliminated.290
TAG grants are particularly restrictive, and their waivers should
thus be emphasized. These grants have a ceiling of $50,000,
and the community must bear 20% of the cost of assistance.291
Achieving these grants may be particularly challenging to lowincome communities, who may not understand how to apply
for waivers of these requirements. Moreover, the grants are
limited to residents of sites on the National Priority List; these
funds would not apply to Spring Valley, which is not listed.
3. Other Avenues
United States citizens have other avenues for active
participation, such as directly lobbying legislators, conducting
grassroots campaigns and pursuing litigation. Spring Valley
citizens have pursued most of these options. In addition to
lobbying that has generated two congressional hearings, the
RAB is seeking additional congressional funding to reduce the
restoration time through292 actions such as numerous visits to
Congress and individual letters, targeted lobbying of select
committees and their chairpersons, and a press event.293 At the
grass-roots level, the RAB is currently planning community
outreach activities, such as targeting sympathetic non-profit
organizations.294
The last option, litigation, creates social friction, distrust
and transaction costs and should be avoided. Citizens who
feel they have an informed and heeded voice in democratic
decision-making structures may accept outcomes as legitimate
without resort to the judicial system.
Overall, an active role for citizens in learning about and
developing future outcomes, rather than merely assessing
proposed solutions, gives local residents a more active stake in
remediation. This role could help legitimize outcomes and
increase citizens’ trust in government.
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E. Assessing Implemented Solutions
Since the 2001 congressional hearing, agencies involved
in Spring Valley have created several organizations to jointly
share information and devise solutions, and the parties have
bolstered the roles of older organizations such as the RAB. A
formal partnership now exists between the main players in the
cleanup, the Corps, EPA and the D.C. Department of Health.295
Representatives actively involved in Spring Valley’s remediation
from each partner agency generally meet monthly to confront
issues together,296 and their decisions require consensus. The
partners also hear and respect opinions of non-members, such
as the Mayor’s Scientific Advisory Panel and the RAB. The
agencies and the community are very positive about the
partnership. DOD sees it as a “model for regulatory
relationships” at site cleanups,297 and the RAB supports the
partnership’s cooperation, openness and consensus. “What
matters most to residents,” according to the RAB, “is that plans
have the unanimous endorsement of the three partners.”298
Agency relationships have been clarified and
coordination improved.
EPA now proclaims oversight of
the Corps’ data pertaining to Spring Valley.299 EPA also has
declared oversight of its own division, EPIC.300 EPA testified
that the “obvious failure to communicate within EPA offices
has been rectified,” by refusing to allow EPIC to perform
contract work and by requiring EPIC to report on its projects
to EPA headquarters offices.301
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(“ATSDR”) and the D.C. Department of Health have started
collaborating closely to produce health analyses.302 In another
collaboration, the D.C. Department of Health is responding
to the Mayor’s Scientific Advisory Panel’s request to implement
a data reporting system to track illnesses that may be related to
contamination and evaluate new and existing data geographically
against known hazards.303
Many of the changes implemented, however, such as
the creation of the partnership, EPA’s new relationship with
the Corps regarding data, and EPA’s relationship with EPIC,
are ad hoc responses. Such partnerships need to be required at
the start of a cleanup, regardless of scale. As seen in Spring
Valley, the initial determination of a project’s scale does not
always match reality.
EPA oversight needs to be further clarified. EPA has
not addressed whether its oversight of the Corps is sitespecific.304 It should not be; such oversight should be required
for reasons discussed earlier, such as self-monitoring.305
Similarly, EPA oversight of its contractor-type divisions is
unclear. EPA only addressed control over EPIC.306 All divisions
within EPA with the ability to contract out services should
meet the same reporting requirements, to prevent analogs of
the miscommunication at Spring Valley between EPA and EPIC.
Other organizations that promote interaction gained
louder voices within the year. The Mayor’s Scientific Advisory
Panel provides a forum for exchanging information and ideas
and is well respected; the D.C. Department of Health follows
the Panel’s recommendations, while the Corps and ATSDR
report developments to the Panel and seek its approval for
their actions.307
The RAB has also increased its presence and activity.
Recent meetings reveal the growing knowledge and power of
the RAB; its members have seized opportunities to gain
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knowledge, obtain additional funds, and lobby Capital Hill.308
The RAB is currently requesting a TAPP grant for outside advice
regarding sampled contaminants, the geophysical investigation
and health issues related to arsenic.309 As the RAB has become
more organized, the group has become more respected; the
Panel’s executive director cites the RAB’s “loud voice” and
“influential” input.310
However, the Panel and RAB still lack power-sharing
authority with decision makers. Both organizations still perform
solely an advisory role. For citizen participation, such as in the
RAB, such authority lends legitimacy to and acceptance of
outcomes.311 In his written testimony, the chairperson of the
Panel stated that involved agencies “have ‘complied’ with its
recommendations” effectively — using “complied” in
quotations, for the agencies have no duty to comply at all. 312
Allowing too many parties to share decision-making power
may hinder timeliness of results, but granting that power when
appropriate aids success of those results.
The cleanup at Spring Valley has long suffered from
refusals and failures to effectively communicate at and within
multiple levels of pertinent government agencies. Statutory
deference, posturing and lack of accountability contributed to
these failures. These issues, coupled with the fear and distrust
trig gered by toxic contamination and ag gravated by
information mishandling and late, powerless public forums,
resulted in failed cleanups, suspicion and lack of public
confidence in any resolution. New approaches may assist
cleanup plans’ success in the realms of both science and public
opinion. Increasing interaction and oversight within agencies
and between agencies is crucial. Statutory provisions and formal
communication forums are two routes to ensuring increased
and effective interaction. Increasing the role of local
governments may also aid successful plans, by providing a closer
link to local concerns and unique knowledge that federal agencies
may lack. Creation of a consensus-based group of experts
may reduce posturing, increase communication and derive solid
and informed cleanup strategies. Finally, community
participation must be emphasized early, increased and
empowered, whether through statutory programs, educational
strategies or other avenues.
V. Conclusion
The spotlight Congress placed on Spring Valley in the
2001 congressional hearing focused attention on problems and
solutions. Agencies have implemented positive changes, but
many problems still exist. Moreover, issues that caused or
contributed to the contamination problem in Spring Valley and
other sites are still outstanding, such as inadequate funding for
the cleanup of FUDS and ignorance of other potentially
contaminated sites.
Though Spring Valley is the first discovered residential
FUDS with chemical and explosive hazards in the United States,
other such sites are likely to surface in coming years. Increasing
populations, suburban expansion and absence of land-use
records are contributing factors. Cleanup of FUDS exhausts
significant time and monetary resources,313 and the addition of
a residential element increases the complexity and urgency of
the cleanup.
Implementation of measures outlined earlier can
reduce costs of time, money and social goodwill, and this
opportunity is present in the Washington, D.C. area. Experts
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have identified fifty-nine FUDS in the District.314 Though many
are known sites of Civil War forts, others are more suspicious
and currently under investigation.315 Numerous other D.C.
sites may be at issue as well, as renewed scrutiny of historic
aerial photographs yields indications that areas previously
considered “no risk” may actually be sites of former trenches
and bunkers.316 Meanwhile, surprises continue to surface in
Spring Valley. Newly discovered historical records and elevated
levels of arsenic in soil at other residential FUDS in the District
caused the D.C. Department of Health to request expanded
munitions searches and testing.317
Citizens of the District of Columbia are already skittish
about the interest and ability of the federal government to
solve chemical contamination situations. These potential sites
are an opportunity for the federal government to revamp its
approach to its responsibilities. Through improved internal
and external communication at all levels of government, expert
groups with non-partisan, common interests in results, and more
proactive and empowered roles for both local citizens and
governments, the federal government may be able to reduce
costs and build its most basic wealth, public trust.
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WORLD NEWS BITS
By Melissa Frisk1

Americas
Chile and the U.S. Finalize Bilateral Trade Agreement
On December 12, 2002, the U.S. and Chile signed a bilateral
trade agreement that has been under negotiation for over a
decade and arguably was largely made possible because of
President Bush’s recently approved “fast track” authority.2 The
trade agreement is applauded for its plan to phase out tariffs
over the next 12 years, but concern by environmentalists exists
regarding Chile’s dependence on natural resource based exports.3
Canada Ratifies the Kyoto Protocol
The Canadian Senate followed the “Commons” (Canadian
House of Representatives) in endorsing the Kyoto Protocol.4
Prime Minister Jean Chretien, formalized the ratification of
the greenhouse gas agreement made by the U.N. in 1997.5
Canada is the runner-up behind the U.S. for being the worst
polluting country per capita, so their ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol will help serve as a model for the U.S. on how to
address global climate change.
What will NEPA look like after the Bush administration
is finished with it?
Recent initiatives by the Bush administration seek to reduce
regulations under the nation’s “Magna Carta” of environmental
law, the National Environmental Policy Act.6 Bush’s “Healthy
Forest Initiative” sets it sights on exempting offshore military
activities in the U.S. Exclusive Economic zone, shortcutting the
environmental review process for certain transportation
projects.7 Also, on the day before Thanksgiving, the Bush
Administration announced forest planning rules that reduce
the public comment period from 135 to 60 days, and remove
a provision that helps ensure the survival of species.8
Clean Air Takes Back Seat, and States Sue
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently
weakened new source review under Clean Air Act, by allowing
for modernization of industrial facilities without proper
controls on emissions.9 The changes to the Clean Air Act are
the most significant under the Bush administration, but rather
than improve the quality of the air, they ease regulations on
pollution control.10 Nine states have filed suit against the Bush
Administration rules, saying that rule-making authority used
exceeded that allowed under their legislative authority.11
Supreme Court Decision on “Deep Ripping”
The U.S. Supreme Court’s tie vote on federal penalties for deep
ripping in wetlands leaves open the dispute over the “normal
farming activities” exemption to the federal Clean Water Act.12
The case concerned a California rancher and his use of “deep
26

ripping” to prepare soil for the cultivation of vineyards and
orchards in the mid-1990’s. The rancher claimed that the he
was engaged in “pure plowing” that should not be regulated
under the federal Clean Water Act due to the exemption for
“normal farming activities.”13 However, the Ninth Circuit held
that that a federal permit was required for “deep ripping,” and
that the exemption does not apply when “land is converted to
a different use.”14

Europe
Fallout after Oil Tanker Disaster Means Stricter
Regulations
On November 19, 2002 the oil tanker “Prestige” went down
off the coast of Galicia, Spain spilling tens of thousands of
tons of oil.15 In response to the disaster, Spain and France
have made a bilateral agreement to impose more stringent
inspections on ships.16 The agreement allows for increased
access to information for government authorities in regards to
tankers traveling in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ’s) of
both countries.17 Additionally, the agreement allows for onthe-spot inspections and expulsion of un-seaworthy ships.18
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar is looking to other
European Union governments to improve maritime safety rules
at the Copenhagen European Union summit meeting in
December. 19

Africa
African Elephants Lose, Latin American Mahogany Gains
at CITES Conference
While mahogany was added to the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species’ (CITES) Appendix II, increasing
regulation by requiring certain states to obtain CITES export
permits and ensure export sustainability, a ban was lifted on
the sale of ivory to the international market in Botswana,
Namibia, and South Africa.20 The sale of ivory will be limited
to ivory stockpiles (“legal stocks that have been collected from
elephants that died of natural causes or as a result of
governments-regulated problem-animal control.”)21 Under the
new consensus on ivory, however, the CITES Secretariat and
Standing Committee may suspend trade for non-compliance
in exporting and importing countries and if it is found that the
trade is having harmful effects on elephant populations in other
African countries. This decision ended a 1989 ban by the United
Nations on international trade in ivory.22
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Middle East
“Responsible Care” and Hazardous-Waste in Israel
The stench around Ramat Hovav Industrial Zone in Israel has
local residents worried about their health and standard of
living.23 The Ramat Hovav Industrial Zone includes the Israeli
national hazardous-waste disposal plant in addition to 16
chemical factories. In an area that suffers from unemployment,
the Industrial Zone provides jobs to around 4,000 people.24
In question are the long-term and cumulative effects from
exposure to the “polluting materials emitted by the plants,”
especially considering the interactions of the various chemicals.25
While the Israeli Ministry of the Environment has released
information on the concentration of pollutants released from
the plants, and the hazardous-waste disposal plant has begun
instituting a project similar to the “responsible care” program
adopted by companies worldwide after the Bhopal disaster,
local and international activists are concerned that the program
will not adequately address health and safety concerns.26

Asia
Land-use Landslides in Malaysia
Four serious landslides in Selangor, Malaysia in the past decade
have some Malaysians outraged by inadequately regulated
development projects on landslide-prone hilltops. Local
lawmakers and activists in Malaysia are seeking a constitutional
amendment that would allow federal authorities to monitor
local development projects through various means, including a
mandatory environmental impact assessment.27
Development in the Hong Kong Harbor
The Wan Chai reclamation, a project recently approved by the
local Town Planning Board, allows for development in the
Hong Kong Harbor, and is controversial because of the
consequences for esthetic enjoyment and environmental damage
in the harbor.28 Some are claiming that the approval of this
development project violates the Protection of the Harbour
Ordinance, which was enacted in 1997. The Ordinance requires
that development projects in the harbor must be considered in
light all reasonable alternatives and whether they are for the
public benefit and essential.
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New Law Requiring Environmental Assessment on
Development Projects in China
The National People’s Congress of China passed an
environmental protection law in October.29 The law, to take
effect on September 1, 2003, requires an environmental impact
assessment for major planning and projects.30
(Footnotes)
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LOCAL CALENDAR
JANUARY
30-31
Washington D.C.
Education for a Sustainable and Secure Future
Organized by: National Council for Science and the
Environment
Web: http://www.ncseonline.org/NCSEconference/
2003conference

MARCH
13-14
Washington D.C.
Sustainable Enterprise Summit
Organized by: World Resources Institute
Web: http://www.wri.org/sep

22-24
Washington D.C.
Organized by: The Earth Technologies Forum
The Conference on Climate Change and Ozone Protection
Web: http://www.earthforum.com
30- May 2
Washington D.C.
EnvironDesign 7
Organized by: EnvironDesign
Web: http://www.isdesignet.com/ED/index.html

28
Washington, D.C.
Communities & Commodities: Linking International Trade
& Sustainable Development
Organized by: American University’s International Law
Review

APRIL
5
Washington D.C.
Conference on the Politics of the Environment
Organized by: Global Communications for Conservation,
Inc.
Web: http://www.gcci.org/conference/politicsenv_dc.html
14-15
Washington D.C.
7th National Symposium on Market Transformation
Organized by: American Council for an Energy Efficient
Economy &
Consortium for Energy Efficiency
Web: http://www.aceee.org

28
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INTERNATIONAL CALENDAR
JANUARY
13-15
Leuven, Belgium
Symposium on History and Forest Biodiversity: Challenge
for Conservation
Organized by: International Union of Forest Research
Organization
Web: http://iufro.boku.ac.at/iufro

FEBRUARY
3-7
Nairobi, Kenya
22nd Session of the UNEP Governing Council
Organized by: United Nations Environment Programme
Web: http://www.unep.org
3-7
Chiang Mai, Thailand
3rd World Congress on Medicinal and Aromatic Plants for
Human Welfare: From
Biodiversity through Science and Technology, Trade and
Industry to Sustainable Use
Organized by: Wocmap III
Web: http://www.wocmap3.org
5-6
Montreal, Canada
Workshop on Transboundary Impacts: Impact Assessment
without Borders
Organized by: Association quèbècoise pour l’èvaluation
d’impacts
Web: http://www.cam.org
6-9
New Dehli, India
Dehli Sustainable Development 2003
Organized by: The Summit Secretariat
Web: http://www.terlin.org/dsds/
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10-12
Montreal, Canada
Expert Group meeting on Indicators of Biological Diversity
Organized by: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity
Web: http://www.biodiv.org
17-21
Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand
ITTO/IUCN International Workshop on Increasing the
Effectiveness of
Transboundary Conservation Areas in Tropical Forests
Organized by: World Conservation Union – IUCN
Web: http://www.iucn.org/themes/fcp/activities/
transboundary1.htm

MARCH
10-14
Rome, Italy
Collaborative Partnership of Forests
Organized by: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization
Web: http://www.fao.org
16-23
Kyoto, Japan
Third World Water Forum
Organized by: Forum Secretariat
Web: http://www.worldwaterforum.org
23-27
Zurich, Switzerland
Fifth International Conference on Environmental Future:
Environmental Future of Aquatic Ecosystems
Organized by: Swiss Federal Institute for Environmental
Science and Technology
Web: http://www.icef.eawag.ch/
24-27
Manila, Philippines
Second International Tropical Marine Ecosystem
Management Symposium
Organized by: International Coral Reef Initiative
Web: http://www.icgeb.org/biosafety
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INTERNATIONAL CALENDAR
31- April 2
Beijing, China
International Symposium on Climate Change
Organized by: China Meteorological Administration
Email: ISCC@cma.gov.cn

Third Session of the United Nations Forum on Forests
Organized by: Secretariat Intergovernmental Forum on
Forests
Web: http://www.un.org/ese/sustdev/forests.htm

APRIL
28-30
Vienna, Austria
Fourth Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests
in Europe
Organized by: Ministerial Conference on the Protection of
Forests in Europe, Liaison Unit Vienna
Web: http://www.mcpfe.org

SOURCE: CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY’S CALENDAR
OF EVENTS
WWW.BIODIV.ORG/EVENTS

MAY
6-8
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Fourth Workshop on Sustainable Use
Organized by: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
Diversity
Web: http://www.biodiv.org
12-24
New York, USA
2nd Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
Organized by: United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights
19-23
Bonn, Germany
International Conference on “Rural Livelihoods, Forests and
Biodiversity”
Organized by: Centre for International Forestry Research
Web: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/shared/template/
events.asp
26- June 6
Geneva, Switzerland
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WRITING COMPETITION
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Writing Competition
SDLP is hosting their first Sustainable Development Writing Competition and is inviting all law students to submit
articles for consideration. Judges include SDLP staff and faculty of American University – Washington College of Law.
The author of the winning article will receive a $250 prize and have their article published in SDLP’s next issue.

TOPIC
Sustainable development has been defined as “development which meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, 1987). Write an article analyzing issues of law and policy pertaining to the struggle between
environmental protection or natural resource use and economic development.

REQUIREMENTS
Papers must be a minimum of twenty double spaced pages in twelve-point font and one-inch margins. Documents
should be submitted in Microsoft Word format by March 15th to sdlp@wcl.american.edu. Include contact information
including name, institution, and e-mail address and phone number. The winner will be notified by May, 2003.
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT US AT:
SDLP@WCL.AMERICAN.EDU
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COMMUNITIES & COMMODITIES:
LINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A CONFERENCE BRINGING TOGETHER PERSPECTIVES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITIES THROUGH A SERIES OF PANELS
ENGAGING WELL-KNOWN REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH FIELDS.
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